"تقرير عن البعثة إلى سيستان، ١٨٩٧" [ظ‎‎٢‎٤] (١٣٤/٥٣)

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(3) Mir Ali Akbar Khan had not to go to Tehran as invited in connection with the mur
der of “ Darwesh Khan,” having squared matters in the usual style.
The order stating he was not now required at Tehran, which had been sent on receipt of
the usual peshkash at the Imperial Treasury, was to the effect that he need not trouble now to
come to Tehran ; and in addition the said order gave Mir Ali Akbar power to punish, in any
way he considered fit, those who showed him any rebellion in his country.
It is reported that the above is a great disappointment to Mir AH’s enemies at Birjand.
(4) Purdil Khan has also brought a copy of the orders of His Highness the Shah re-open-
Denied by Sartip when spoken to about putting routes, with diiections to the Sartip to
obstacles in my way when carrying out His Highness give publication to them throughout Seistan.
the Shah’s orders by agreement with the Powers.
(5) There are numerous applicants * seeking permission from Government to be allowed to
re-excavate the old karezes at Kistaka, Sindak,
Amir Chah, Robat, etc.
* “ Baloch.”
(6) The re-establishing of these karezes and cultivation in the vicinity of our thanas is in
the opinion of the writer, an important matter for the consideration of Government and has
been reported in detail to the Agent to the Governor-General, Baluchistan,
(7) It is reported that Russian troops have reached Ghain, that they come iuto the
villages, and that no obstacles are put in their way in crossing the frontier.
(8) The Governor of Birjand has generally sanctioned the Ijaras for this year’s crops
earlier than usual, to afford the Russians an opportunity of purchasing grain in Ghain.
(9) Last week the Russian news-writer received a letter from the Russian Doctor that
he was to explain to the Sartip that he (Russian Doctor) had reported to the Russian authori
ties that the British officer had been allowed to remain in the country, and that he (Russian
news-writer) was to work so as to drive us out of the country.
(10) This is why obstacles were put in our way last week and all supplies stopped by
order of officials, which difficulty now happily has been smoothed over and all supplies are forth
coming.
(11) There is every reason for believing that this is not the doing of the Sartip himself or
his mother, but has been the outcome of plots hatched against us by the Naib-ul-Hukmat and
the news-writer, who apparently are working hand and glove with the Birjand officials agaiust
British prestige and against the power of Mir Ali Akbar, the Governor of Tabas and Seistan.
(12) It is a strong policy of the Russians to get hold of these two men, and with liberal
distribution of peshkash, etc., at Birjand they have secured the influence of the Sartip’s rio-ht-
hand man, viz. y Naib-ul-Hukmat, and things are worked by him as if emanating from°the
Sartip.
(13) The Sartip’s mother is a most shrewd and business-like clever woman, but as far as
possible things are concealed from her too and I have every reason to suppose both from her
letters and actions that she is most favourably disposed toward us.
(14) The plot anent the order issued to all Kad Kudas not to supply our camp not having
succeeded as anticipated, a much more serious one was set on foot which came to my notice
through Mulla Muhammad Raza’s kindness and generosity.
(15) The Kad Kuda of Ramak was for three days in Nasratahad staying with the parties
above referred to (officials) and came back having secretly arranged the following plot
“ He was to get some 15 badmashes of villages who were to take with them some
women at midnight, and, when near our camp, the women were to cry loudly for help where
upon the men were to come up and all create a great row and say the British soldiers had got
hold of the women, so as to report to the Mulla and people, and try to drive out the British
officer and his men in disgrace from the country.”
(16) On hearing this, I immediately made all necessary arrangements in camp for any
surprise and rode into the village square, called the Kad Kuda and people and told him
straight what 1 had heard, cautioning them “ that now he and his men could come when they
liked, but that the first man we saw near camp I should fire on him straight, and that the
bloodshed would be at his door.”
They showed rather a sullen front, but the threat had its effect for we were unmolested
after that, though all supplies were cut off.
(17) On personal representation and communications passing between Sartip and myself,
all difficulties have ended and supplies, etc., are all forthcoming.
(18) As yet I have not heard from the Agent to the Governor-General, Khorasan, so I
conclude my letters never reached him ; this is getting serious, for 1 am running short of
money and we cannot get on here without it.
(19) In another 10 days when the greater heat subsides, I propose putting the escort in
camp at Rohat with suitable supplies, and proceeding with a small party to Tahas to see Mir
Ali Akbar and learn more of Russian politics at Birjand, etc., etc.
(20) It is reported that they (Russians) are working hard to establish themselves both at
Birjand and Kerman, so as to command the Bandar Abbas-Kerman-Khorasan trade route.