مجموعة ٧/٦(١) "اليمن: العلاقات بين الحكومة البريطانية والإمام". [و‎‎١‎٥‎٣] (٧٨٢/٣١٦)

is already ensured by the Royal Air Force and the existence
of a treaty might lessen our freedom to take immediate air
action in case oi aggression or interference on the Imam , s
part'h flie Air Staif consider that the correctness of this
point of view is well borne out by the reaction of the Imam
to the threat of immediate air attack following upon his
recent interference with Protectorate tribesmen in the region
of Wadi Beihan. In this instance the existence of a treaty
would have necessitated negotiations and the futility of
negotiating with a potentate possessing the mentality of the
Imam can be appreciated in the light of past experience.
Furthermore the Air Staff wish to draw attention to the
effect which the negotiation of and possible agreement on a
treaty with the Imam might have on questions affecting the
Protectorate tribes and the problem of air control,, It is
the degree of protection afforded to Protectorate tribes
against Imamic aggression which decides their attitude towards
British administration, If the active protection to which
the Tribes have now become accustomed is replaced by the less
direct method of negotiation with its inevitable delays the
allegiance of the tribes will cease to be so ready and
adverse reaction on internal security will be the likely result
The Air Staff have put forward these views in order
to show that from the purely military aspect there is more to
be lost than to be gained by the conclusion of a treaty.
If 5 however, political or commercial interests are
considered to override the military aspect the Air Staff feel
that should press for terms no less favourable than
those contained in the proposals submitted to the Imam hy
Sir Stewart Symes in November 1929,
In connection with the specific proposals now put
forward by the Imam it is considered that reversion to the
original frontier, that is, evacuation of Audhali territory and
the restoration of Protectorate chiefs held as hostages must
be a pre-condition to the opening of negotiations. Moreover
the Air Staff are of the opinion that a treaty should contain
definite acknowledgment by the Imam of the boundary
settlement of 1903, 1904 and 1905 and. of the special relations
existing between the chiefs of the Protectorate tribes and
His Majesty 5 s Government.
The Air Staff agree with Lt.Col. Reilly that the
insertion by the Imam in
M -• T —_T- «- tt
ill
draft
article
III of the words
original rights” in place of ’'claims" as in the H.M.G. draft
of 1929 and the omission of the words "or that His Majesty's
Government recognise any part of his claims" is not acceptable
in view of our obligations under the treaties with the
Protectorate chiefs. In addition it is considered that the
Imam should be required to omit his reference in article III
to the "islands of the Yemen*
j-iie
sovereignty of Perim,
which we have occupied continuously since 1857, cannot be
called in question,. Nor should we al]_ow even a hypothetical
claim by the Imam to "the islands of the Yemen" in view of
the strategic value of these islands. Their status is already
sufficiently indeterminate without adding this additional
complication.
- 2 '
*ur
iJS
1.0