"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد II." [و‎‎١‎١‎٣] (٦٦٠/٢٣٤)

ADVANCE TO START ABOUT 3rd JAN. 195
General Aylmer asked that a decision might be come to
before the 25th December to allow of his making the necessary
arrangements.
On the 18th December General Nixon answered agreeing
that General Aylmer should start his advance from Ali Gharbi
on the 3rd January or as soon after as possible. He considered
that it should be possible to concentrate at Ali Gharbi by that
date a force of five brigades and forty-six guns with four
gunboats.* This, with General Townshend’s force, would
give us about 23,000 combatants and 84 guns to deal with
Turkish forces, which might possibly amount to 36,000 men
and about 100 guns,f but would probably amount to 20,000
men and about 60 guns; and he considered that General
Aylmer’s force, plus that of General Townshend, would suffice
to relieve Kut.
General Aylmer now asked General Nixon in a personal
letter whether it was still the intention of H.M. Government
that the Tigris force should, after the relief of Kut, push on
and occupy Baghdad ; and he asked for General Nixon’s views
on the forthcoming operations. In reply to this, General Nixon
telegraphed on the 25th December that his intention was not
to advance beyond Kut for the time being ; and he followed
up this telegram with a letter giving his views more fully.
He said that his latest instructions were to capture and hold
Baghdad, but that after relieving Kut he had no intention of
advancing further until the remaining reinforcements had
reached Mesopotamia and the 6th Division had been re
organised. He had asked for two more divisions to be sent
him, but had been told that these could not be furnished for
the time being. He mentioned the protection of the oilfields
as an embarrassment which might require troops ; and the
augmentation of his river transport, expected to the number
of some two hundred craft, would take time.
Reports received by General Aylmer from General Town
shend from the 16th to the 19th December indicated an
improvement in the situation at Kut. The enemy had shown
general apathy, the British daily casualties were less, the
defences of Kut were becoming quite efficient and a change
for the better in the moral of the Indian troops was noticeable.
* General Nixon, however, concluded his telegram by saying that this
must depend on the arrival of the reinforcements from overseas ; two days
later he heard from the India Office that the estimate of date of arrivals
furnished by the Admiralty appeared to be too optimistic.
t This number included the Turkish 26th and 36th Divisions, both of which
had been reported en route to Mesopotamia, but neither of which materialised.