"العلاقات البريطانية مع خزعل، شيخ المحمرة." [و‎‎٤] (٢٤/٧)

the acting Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, addressed a letter to the Sheikh
containing the revised assurances. The text of this letter need not be reproduced
here because it mentioned the co-operation to be expected from the Sheikh in the
capture of Basra, and, as the question of such co-operation did not actually arise,
the Sheikh, after the capture of Basra, asked for a revised letter from which the
passages relating thereto should be omitted. Sir P. Cox therefore addressed to
him a new letter bearing the date the 22nd November, 1914 (i.e., that on which
Basra was occupied by British forces), which became the master document, the
text of which is reproduced as document No. 6 in the annex.
The War Period.
19. It may be recorded briefly that the Sheikh was of positive assistance to
His Majesty’s Government during the war, largely by his maintenance of order in
that part of Persia where British interests were so considerable. This was particu
larly the case in 1915 when certain unruly tribes under his jurisdiction, incited by
the preaching of a jehad by Turkish agents, rose in revolt and assisted the Turks
in an attack on British troops at Ahwaz and in cutting the Anglo-Persian Oil
Company’s pipe line; on that occasion the Sheikh did much to facilitate the rapid
restitution of order as soon as the Turks had been driven back. Towards the end
of 1915, when it appeared probable for a time that Persia would intervene in the
war on the side of the enemy, there was some discussion of recognising the Sheikh’s
independence in that event, but, as the emergency never in fact occurred,
Sir P. Cox’s letter of the 22nd November, 1914, remained the final embodiment
of His Majesty’s Government’s commitments to the Sheikh.
The Post-War Period, 1919-20.
20. The end of hostilities in Europe and in the Ottoman Empire brought
little improvement in the state of Persia, which continued to exercise His Majesty’s
Government. The danger from Germany and Turkey was now removed but that
from Russia was revived in a new form—Bolshevism. The Sheikh’s territories,
by contrast, remained generally quiet, to the benefit of British interests which had
grown enormously. Although order was maintained in the Sheikh’s territories,
this was achieved only by autocratic and oppressive rule and the Sheikh was no
longer a popular ruler. He maintained his control of the tribes by a policy of
breaking the power of any sheikh or tribe likely to become too strong and a danger
to his rule, replacing the suspected leaders by agents of his own selection who
governed the tribes and collected revenue from them; in the process, incidentally,
he acquired personal possession of much property. He now feared for his life,
and Chassib Khan, his eldest son, whom he had appointed as Governor of
Mohammerah in 1919, came under suspicion, as a result of which he was removed
from his post in 1921 and thenceforward carefully watched. Khazal continued
to enjoy the support of His Majesty’s Government, who, however, had not, in
his opinion, sufficiently rewarded him for his past services. (In particular, he
was disappointed that Feisal ibn Hussein had been chosen as King of Iraq
rather than himself.)
The rise of Reza Khan.
21. The beginning of the decline of the Sheikh’s power coincided with,
and was a direct result of, the rise of Reza Khan, who was ultimatelv personally
responsible for the Sheikh’s complete downfall. General Reza Khan arrived
at Tehran with his force of Cossacks in February, 1921, took control of the
capital and from that time, until he became Prime Minister himself in October,
1923, was, as Minister of War, the main force in Persian politics His immediate
policv was to bring the country under the control of the Central Government,
and for this purpose he organised military formations in the distant parts which
had hitherto been largely outside the control of the Government; at first, however,
he found it politic to leave the Sheikh’s territories alone.
Financial dispute between the Sheikh and the Persian Government.
22. Prior to the advent of Reza Khan, the Central Government had been
showing resentment at the prosperity of Arabistan from which they were deriving
no direct financial benefit owing to {a) the non-payment by the Sheikh of his
annual revenue (maliyat), and (b) the appropriation to himself by the Sheikh
of all indirect taxation. It is unnecessary here to enter into details of the
Goaf. 13055.*
Conf. 11794 *
Conf. 13055,*
p. 222.
Ditto, p. 220.