مجموعة ٣٦/٦(١) "شؤون حدود شرق الأردن-نجد". [ظ‎‎٢‎٣‎٣] (٩٣٢/٤٧٧)

• * ' - - ^
by the publication of the facts. I suggested that they had reverted instead t 0
what he would forgive my calling the old Turkish method. They had arrested
people for talking, and had published nothing but variants on t- ibn Rifada and
his party are where they were. Please God they will soon be destroyed."
Sheikh Yussuf said that the arrests had really been made in connexion with the
Ad Dabbagh affair, which we had already discussed. After some further
exchanges on this subject, I spoke about the position m the Wadi Sirhan. Hey
had accused the Amir Abdullah of trying to foment disturbance there. I had
reported the accusation, but, as it was of little use to discuss Hejazi suspicions
of the Amir, I was more interested in the question whether there was, in fact,
disturbance in the W^adi Sirhan. My latest infoimation was that none was
known to exist. We then spoke of the difficulties of wireless communication
between Hejazi and Transjordan stations, a question which has been fully dealt
with by telegraph.
6. Our conversations on the 22nd, 23rd and 25th July related very largely
to the position of the Amir Abdullah, which the sheikh introduced by avowing his
belief in oral discussion of questions that might become “too fundamental” if
dealt with in official correspondence. As this subject may still be important, I
enclose an extract^) from my record of what passed on the 22nd July. I have
sufficiently summarised in my Saving telegram No. 6 of the 26th July the more
diffuse conversations of the 23rd and 25th July, both of which were wearisome
and the sound of which was acid. I need only add that, when, for tactical
reasons, I pressed my hypothetical question as to whether the Hejazi Government
would consider a tribunal under article 6 of the Hadda Agreement an appropriate
means of investigating an accusation by the Amir or the Transjordan
Government against Ibn Baud, the sheikh ended a series of evasions by
saying that he could not answer it without consulting his Government, whereupon
I said that he had said enough for my purpose, and withdrew it rather than take
the risk of its being hawked about in the Council of Ministers, and perhaps
misconstrued. Next morning, when serenity was restored, I reminded
Sheikh Yussuf of the hypothetical nature of that particular question and of the
unequivocal nature of the answer which I had said I should: give to it, namely,
that a joint tribunal under article 6 could in no circumstances be a suitable means
of investigating an accusation brought against Ibn Saud.
7. I may here mention that, at the end of the conversation of the 23rd July,
Sheikh Yussuf asked whether he might speak as a purely private individual and
tell me what he would think if he were British. He suggested that His Majesty’s
Government might be expected to say, in effect: “ Here’s Abdullah, a rotten
fellow, who causes us endless trouble and expense. Here’s Ibn Saud, powerful
and well-disposed. We’ll plump for Ibn Saud.” I explained to him at length
that, after a system containing elements of stability had emerged out of events in
Arabia since toefore the Great War, in which the Hashimites had done much to
help, it was not a question for His Majesty’s Government of choosing between
two rulers, but of maintaining friendship with both and promoting good relations
between them. I told him what I should think, if I were a Nejdi. I need not
enlarge on this, for I am afraid that my Nejdiness was at least as much coloured
by British ideas as the sheikh’s assumed British outlook was affected by hatred
of the Hashimites. We had, however, a very amusing private exchange of views
and nearly exchanged headgear at the end of it.
8. The conversations of the 26th, 27th and 29th July related mainly to other
matters, but on the 27th July we dealt with one or two points which haven
bearing on Transjordan. Sheikh Yussuf startled me by speaking of
President Hoover’s disarmament proposal on the lines described in my Saving
telegram No. 8 of the 27th July. He was evidently thinking in terms of security
for Hejaz-Nejd, with special reference to security on the Transjordan^ side.
I took the opportunity of telling him that morning that H.M.S. “ Hastings ” had
had to leave for the Mediterranean, and that it had become rather a question as
to how H.M.S. “ Penzance ” could be most usefully employed; but, as I had ha
no reply to my telegram No. 138 of the 24th July, 1 did not dwell on this problem
or give Sheikh Yussuf an opportunity of expressing views. I pointed on,
however, that it was increasingly important for us to be informed as to the
military situation. This elicited some information, which I duly telegrap e
to you and which is now out of date.
( x ) Not printed.
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