"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. مجلد I" [ظ‎‎٣‎٩] (٤٥٤/٨٣)

58 HISTORY OF THE WAR : MESOPOTAMIA
revenues, in readiness for Imperial service outside India, in
excess of the forces required for self defence ; ” and, after
alluding to the many precedents for the employment of Indian
contingents for Imperial purposes at Imperial expense, they
continued, “ Indeed, in the event of a grave emergency arising
which threatens the integrity of the British Empire, all parts
of the Empire must be prepared to run risks in support of the
forces operating at the decisive point. We are therefore of
opinion that, while the army in India should not be specifically
maintained for the purpose of meeting external obligations
of an Imperial character, it should be so organised and equipped
as to be capable of affording ready overseas co-operation, when
the situation in India allows of it, in such direction as His
Majesty’s Government may determine.” They recommended
that the field army should consist of seven divisions, five cavalry
brigades, and certain army troops, as being the force they
considered necessary* to deal with a combination against India
of Afghanistan and the tribes on the North-West Frontier ;f
and they further recommended that the annual military
expenditure should be limited to 19-5 million pounds sterling.
The Committee consisted of Field-Marshal Lord Nicholson
(President), Lieutenant-Generals Sir Percy Lake and Sir
Robert Scallon, and Sir William Meyer, the Finance member
of the Governor-General’s Council. The Majority Report
(drawn up by Lord Nicholson and Sir William Meyer) did not
meet the views of the other two members and they submitted
a separate report, disagreeing in several particulars with the
Majority Report, the main difference that we are here concerned
with being that they considered ” that there are strong
grounds for the conclusion that a field army of less than nine
divisions and five cavalry brigades will not be adequate to
deal satisfactorily with a combination against us of Afghanistan
and the tribes on the North-West Frontier, if any hope is to
be entertained of bringing the operations to a reasonably
rapid conclusion.”
* The Committee had placed the maintenance of internal security and
tranquillity as the first condition governing the size of the army and they
stated that they considered that Lord Kitchener had been unduly optimistic
in relegating it to a position of minor importance and in reducing the size
of the force allotted to that duty. In their review of the question they
increased the latter force again and this ipso facto led to a reduction of the
field army".
t Iheir contention was “ we hold that in present conditions, if we provide
a field army fully adequate to deal with the maximum external danger to
which India is now exposed, i.e., a war with Afghanistan in combination
with the tribes, this army will also suffice to meet any minor contingency
arising elsewhere.”