"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. مجلد I" [ظ‎‎٨‎٩] (٤٥٤/١٨٣)

156 HISTORY OF THE WAR : MESOPOTAMIA
the Euphrates; and this idea seemed to be further confirmed
by the report that the force was bringing with it many rifles
and much ammunition, as these would be required to arm
the Arabs * General Barrett at once telegraphed to India
that a move to Amara might lock up troops required to meet
a Turkish advance down the Euphrates. He, therefore now
recommended that an advance to Suq ash Shuyukh and Nasiriva
should be undertaken first. Although the attitude of Aiaimi
was uncertain, another of the Muntafik notables had assured
Sir P. Cox that the tribe would be friendly to us if we would
protect them permanently from the Turks. The occupation
of Nasiriya would go some way towards accomplishing this.
General Barrett also believed that Ibn Saud was moving north
in the direction of Nasiriya, and it was hoped to arrange for
his co-operation. By holding Qurna and Nasiriya we should
be favourably situated to meet the Turks either on the Tigris
or on the Euphrates.
In the next few days, the news that reinforcements were
on their way to Baghdad from Constantinople was confirmed.
It was also reported from several sources that the Xllth
(Mosul) Army Corps had left Aleppo for Baghdad. This
consisted of the 35th and 36th Divisions, composed mainly of
Arabs and Kurds, with a nominal strength of 25,000, with
seventy-two old - pattern guns. Large numbers, however,
had deserted, and it was said that the corps had been found
unfit to fight in Syria.
The Government of India came to the conclusion that the
situation was still too indefinite to allow of a decision. They
wished to hear more of Ibn Saud and of conditions on the
uphrates. Lord Crewe agreed that it was necessary to await
developments, and General Barrett was told on the 4th January
not to advance on Amara or Nasiriya without previous reference
to India. y
Towards the end of December the Turkish force from Amara
un er Djavid Pasha moved south to Ezra’s Tomb, twenty-two
nu es from Qurna, near which place the Arabs were daily
ecoming m ore aggressive. The British garrison of Quma had
™ —~^ 4 ucnuy ascertained that the IVth Turkish Army Corps was
tip« Basra. But this report exemplifies one of our greatest difficul-
tn \foc^ 0r ^ t S m ^ s l a ^Bnor and Syria were constantly reported on the move
nninf^ i )0 amia ; But transportation was slow, and there were many possible
thrrvnrri? iversion to other theatres of operations. News took time to come
fnrrp ^L^ ari f WaS °^ en unr eliable. Consequently, further news of any given
commanH not received for weeks. In the meantime a force
forrpm on + CI " C ° U i ? on ty hope that the first confirmation of reported rein-
wou d not be their arrival opposite our troops in the field.