"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. مجلد I" [ظ‎‎١‎٢‎١] (٤٥٤/٢٤٧)

220 HISTORY OF THE WAR : MESOPOTAMIA
the 18th Infantry Brigade and the 48th Pioneers were, however
to remain in a camp near Zubair, under the command of
General Fry. On the same date, General Nixon asked India to
expedite the despatch to Mesopotamia of the seven light draught
steamers which had been procured at the request of General
Barrett, as he pointed out that the presence of ample light
draught river craft was essential for operations in the direc
tion of Nasiriya. He also reported that he had sent orders
to the Euphrates flotilla to blockade the main channel of the
Euphrates at Suq ash Shuyukh ; to operate against the Turkish
columns there and at Khamisiya; and to report as to the
feasibility of further operations. With these objects, this
force was being reinforced from Ourna by one company each
from the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry
and the 103rd Mahrattas. On the 18th, the British cavalry,
reconnoitring to Nukhaila, got into touch with the Blockade
force and found that the enemy were reported to be between
Khamisiya and Nasiriya, where it was said that they were
being harassed and attacked by Arabs. The inland route
taken^ by the Turks rendered them immune from attack by
the Blockade force, which was now ordered to reconnoitre
the water approaches of the Hammar lake and to Suq ash
Shuyukh. 4
The Mesopotamia Commission Report says: “ The occupa
tion of Qurna .... and the victory at Barjisiya ....
had realised the plan of the British Government in sending
the expedition, save that something still remained to be done
to complete the protection of the supply of oil.” In view,
however, of the decided opinion expressed by Lord Hardinge
and others on the spot, and acquiesced in by the India Office,
that Basra could not be considered as secure without the
occupation of Nasiriya and Amara, this statement appears
open to question.
The battle of Shaiba had several decisive results. It cleared
the western approaches to Basra of a dangerous menace;
it restored the power of initiative to the British ; and it
dissipated for the time being any chance of effective action
by the Turks. Moreover, it gave General Nixon time and
opportunity to consider the situation and to decide on the
action he would take.
There were several alternatives before him. He could
push on towards Nasiriya and, taking advantage of the Turks’
disorganisation and the enmity now being displayed towards
them by the Arabs, might even be able to occupy Nasiriya,