"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. مجلد I" [ظ‎‎١‎٣‎٥] (٤٥٤/٢٧٥)

246 HISTORY OF THE WAR : MESOPOTAMIA
details of the troops and ships that could be placed at General
Townshend’s disposal for the operations, indicated certain
positions where obstructions in the river were to be removed
and where posts should be located for the future line of com
munication control, asked that the operation orders should be
framed in accordance with the instructions in the “ Field
Service Regulations,” and requested General Townshend to
submit a report as to the measures he proposed for carrying
out General Nixon’s instructions.
Next day, General Townshend submitted a memorandum to
General Nixon giving his views on the situation. There
appeared to him to be three alternative methods of attacking
the Turkish position. The first, involving a turning movement
to the west of the Tigris, was, he considered, undesirable and
almost impossible, owing to the flooded marshes with their high
reeds and the depth of the creeks that would have to be crossed.
The second, involving a similar turning movement, but to the
east of the Tigris, he also dismissed, as it would mean crossing
the Ruta creek and the Tigris and did not menace the Turkish
line of retreat. The third, which was the method he proposed
to adopt, was a frontal attack in strength, assisted by an
enveloping movement by a detachment along the eastern
bank of the Tigris. This attack was to be undertaken methodic
ally in successive phases, and would depend for its success on
the intimate co-operation of the land force and the ships and
on the effect of the heavy gunfire being what was expected.
General Nixon gave his general approval to General
Townshend’s plan ; but in view of his own responsibility for
pressing on General Townshend the attack in heliums and
realising that its success would, in a great measure, be dependent
on details, General Nixon spent much of his time during the
next two or three weeks in discussing with him the various
arrangements for the operations. This, while it may have had
the disadvantage of apparent interference with his subordinate’s
initiative, enabled General Nixon, as the supreme commander,
to intervene effectively and without delay to put right any
difficulties which might arise.
From this time onwards, preparations for the advance were
carried out energetically. At Basra, the sappers were kept
very busy preparing water craft, including the shielded heliums,
rafts for mountain and machine guns, barges for heavy guns,
and muhailas for hospital purposes and for engineering and
other stores. Every requirement of the attacking force had
to be thought out and arranged for beforehand and most