"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. مجلد I" [و‎‎١‎٤‎٧] (٤٥٤/٢٩٨)

SHORTAGE OF RIVER TRANSPORT
269
suitable available craft had to be requisitioned. Such vessels
were seldom satisfactory and many of them sunk or were
badly damaged on the overseas voyage. The evidence given
before the Mesopotamia Commission shows many of the diffi
culties and the mistakes made ; but whether the Commission
were correct in their allocation of the blame for the shortage
is another matter* The whole question is very involved and
technical; many individuals and several different authorities
were concerned ; and all the relevant facts do not appear to
have been brought to light, and are still somewhat obscure.
In these circumstances, to enter into great, but unavoidably
incomplete, detail in this narrative might lead the reader to
draw inaccurate conclusions.
On the 12th June, General Nixon asked for more aeroplanes.
The Viceroy telegraphed the gist of his report to the India
Office a few days later and strongly recommended the provision
of more and better aircraft; and by the end of the month he
received a reply that the War Office had agreed to detail two
flights of the Royal Flying Corps from Egypt for service in
Mesopotamia. . , •
By the middle of June the heat everywhere m Mesopotamia
had become so great as to affect seriously the health of the
troops ; and this was further aggravated by the difficulty of
convalescence in this trying chmate.t Owing to the amount of
sickness and the numbers of the medical corps who had been
invalided, General Nixon was obliged on the 18th ^ mak e a
special application for more medical personnel; and these the
Government of India proceeded to arrange for. As an instance
of the amount of sickness, General Nixon reported on the
24th that the l/4th Hampshire Regiment could only muste
16 officers and 289 other ranks medically fit for service, but,
nevertheless, he had to utilise this battalion m the impending
0 Tflways th alto thfcapture of Amara, General Nixon
■estimated the situation of the Turkish troops as follows at
Baghdad four battalions ; at Kut al Amara, ten battalions and
twelve guns; at Nasiriya, five to seven battalions with a few
guns; Lid retiring up the Tigris from Amara, the remnant
of twelve battalions, a cavalry regiment and nine guns.
rt t y oT^nS r a“^“th^tXey could reject no instance when
the heat had been so oppressive.