ملف رقم ١٢٨٣\١٩١٣ الجزء ٥ "التجارة في بلاد الرافدين، إصدار تقرير تجارة جديد" [ظ‎‎١‎٠‎٥] (٢٧٠/٢٠٦)

32
Yeab 1913-14.
Geimau competition.
V
Russian competition
Total
trade.
Value of
. British
trade.
Route.
£
£
1 .
Trebizond (into Azerbaijan)
. 2,325,388*
176,698t
2 .
Kermanshah (via Khanikin) .
. 1,553,528
1,125,740J
3.
Mohammerah ....
914,065§
510,444
4.
Bushire .....
. 1,427,532
714,520
5.
Bandar Abbas ....
. 726,337
464,899
6 .
Lingafr-. .....
306,512
179,966
7.
Baluchistan and Afghanistan
. 262,077
131,103 [|
Totai.
. 7,515,619
3,303,390
* Total trade of Azerbaijan by all routes during the
year 1911-12>
Separate figures for the Trebizond route are not recorded,
f Figure for the year 1911-12.
J Including a rough estimate for exports, which are not recorded
by countries.
§ Exclusive of Anglo-Persian Oil Company’s plant and material.
(1 Trade via the Nashki route only. Figure for Afghanistan is not
recorded.
The marginally noted table shows roughly the proportion of the total British
trade which passed by each of
these avenues. Eussian trade
entered Persia mainly from
the north, and the subsidised
steamship line from Odessa to
the Persian Gulf hardly
affected British seaborne trade.
German competition was
mainly felt by British mer
chants at the ports, although
less than half German trade
entered Persia through the
Gulf. The progress of German
commerce and shipping in the
Gulf has been already des
cribed, and it is sufficient to
say that the main danger lay
in the fact that the German
line, by means of its sugar
carrying contracts, was working itself into a powerful position at the expense
of British shipping. German rivalry was severely felt at Mohammerah and on
the Karun river, and this aspect of the matter is dealt with separately below.
At other Gulf ports a variety of articles of haberdashery and hardware as well
as synthetic indigo, woollens and velvets and, to a lesser degree, cottons and
yarns were imported direct from the continent, while in the matter of exports
the Germans were showing considerable ingenuity and enterprise. Still, on
the whole, they were not regarded as serious antagonists and German competi
tion was only to be feared as a sympton of the subtle attack which was being
made upon British interests in other more vital quarters. Eussian trade has
been, and still is, the real complement of British trade in Persia and a compara
tive study of British and Eussian methods and spheres of interest is an essential
preliminary to an understanding of the situation.
68. Mention was made in paragraph 2 above of the fact that Messrs. Maclean
and Newcomen were deputed in 1903 and 1904 respectively to study the trade
situation. The conclusions at which they arrived in their respective reports on
the subject of Eussian and British trade rivalry have been analysed in Appendix
IV and may be summarised briefly as follows.
The development of Eussian trade during the decade 1892-1902 seemed
attributable to the following reasons
(1) Eussia enjoyed special advantages from her superior geographical
position, since the most cultivated, populous and prosperous
provinces of Persia were adjacent to the Eussian border.
(2) The Persian customs tariff of 1903 had been devised by Eussian
diplomacy with the express object of favouring Eussian and
discriminating against British trade.
(3) Eussia had taken special measures to encourage the export of
Eussian goods to Persia by granting favourable through rates
and drawback of duty, and by providing banking facilities, while
imports to Eussia from Persia were carefully fostered; raw cotton
in particular being charged a very much lower rate of duty than
cotton imported across the European and Black Sea frontiers.
The result of this was that in 1904 Eussia was attracting practi
cally the whole of the raw cotton exported by Persia, that is to
say, 237,000 out of 240,000 cwt.
(4) Eussian manufactures had made great progress.
(5) British trade was handicapped owing to (a) the insecurity and
inadequacy of communications, {b) the illegal imposts such as
rahdari and dalali, (<?) the ill-devised customs regulations and the
obstructiveness and irrational methods of Belgian officials, (d) the