مجموعة ٦ / ٦٧ (٦) "حدود جنوب شرق الجزيرة العربية وقطر: امتيازات النفط في الساحل المتصالح" [ظ‎‎١‎٥‎٤] (٤٠٢/٣١٥)

4
(1939).
be
in
n q nr! from feel in a - resentment at the arbitral y manner
e difficult to prevent Ibn Smid aI f(j i n the event of an international
which his claims had been trea ^ Ma j esty ’s Government s enemies to
emergency it would be all tne easiei igf ti of his territorial claims if
m fiaLce Ibn Saud by a ^ dghip Great B ^^ n .
he abandoned his traditional }»l ^ whole question might be discut d
letter concluded with a suggesti office and the India Office at an
orally between representatives oi the forei 0
informal meeting. suggestion and as a result of the divergence
11. In pursuance ’^f^^ween the India Office and the Foreign
of opinion on this mattei wh ^nd February, 1939, between representatives of
Office, a meeting was held on vi ew to finding some method of
the Foreign Office and ^efodia ^ ^ {rom reaching a
preventing the negotiatio ma( j e t j ie representative of the Foreign
Offic^thafan offer should be made to Ibn Sand to submit the question of the
Office that an onei suuu , an( j t i ie representatives of the India
south-eastern houndaries ^ WO uld state their proposals in writing,
SlfwoSb. pre p^d, in cLEltMion wi.h ,h,
Gnveram^of Indinco wn^d^thwn^ informa| i ctter was ^ n t by the Foreign
Office to the India Office setting out ideas for a procedure whereby the question
St be orevented from reaching deadlock, and discussing various difficulties
regarding the scope and nature of arbitration and the choice of the arbitrator.
It was pointed out that, in this question, His Majesty’s Government stood m
relation to the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi in two separate capacities—as the Power
which was internationally responsible for his actions, and as the Power which
was responsible to him only for the Khor-el-Odeid. The fact that His Majesty s
Government told the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi in 1906 that they regarded certain
areas as lying in his territory did not constitute proof that that area did lie m
his territory, or invalidate any claims which a third party— e.g., Saudi Arabia—
might have to it; and if that party put forward these claims, His Majesty s
Government in their capacity as the Power responsible for Abu Dhabi must,
even out of merely neighbourly good feeling, take all responsible steps to reach
a just settlement without regard to the difficulties in which their actions might
involve them in their capacity as guarantor. In the second case, it was suggested
that, if His Majesty’s Government could not grant Ibn Sand his request or
even offer him a procedure by which he stood a chance of getting what he asked
if he could make out any adequate case without breaking the pledge made to a
neighbouring sheikh, His Majesty’s Government would have to find some
method of compensating the sheikh in other directions. With regard to the
nature of the pledge given in 1906 by His Majesty’s Government to the Sheikh
of Abu Dhabi, it seemed to the Foreign Office to be clearly a pledge on the part
of His Majesty’s Government to use their best endeavours to prevent the
occupation by any other ruler of the area of undefined extent adjoining the
Khor-el-Odeid. But the form of His Majesty’s Government’s endeavours would
necessarily vary with the circumstances, and if, as a result of the employment
of diplomatic methods, including, it might he, arbitration or mediation, the third
party could make a justifiable claim to the area, it did not seem that His
Majesty’s Government would remain under an obligation to resist by forcible
methods the occupation of the area by the third party; His Majesty’s Govern
ment could not do more for their client than they could do for themselves in
similar circumstances, and it was suggested that the client similarly could not
expect His Majesty’s Government to do more on his behalf than the intrinsic
merits of his case permitted. It was also suggested that, if Ibn Baud wished to
dispute the legal claim of the Sheikh of Abu Hhabi, and to claim that he was in
law the owner of the territory, the 1906 pledge could not possibly mean that His
Majesty s Government were bound to resist Ibn Baud by force and to refuse to
submit the legal question to arbitration, which would be the normal course. If
18 Majesty s Government did so, it would be quite inconsistent with their
continual pi of ess ions of attachment in principle to pacific settlement of inter-
nfitronaJ disputes. In conclusion, the Foreign Office asked that the Sheikh of
on Dhabi siiouId be warned that His Majesty’s Government might find it
necessary to agree that the question of the frontier, including the section near
\ oi-el-Odeid. should be submitted to some form of peaceful settlement, such as