"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية: العمليات في بلاد فارس ١٩١٤-١٩١٩" [ظ‎‎١‎٨‎٥] (٥٦٦/٣٧٥)

322
OPERATIONS IN PERSIA
Persian demands from the Bakhtiaris at Isfahan for the withdrawal of
p0lit British the British-paid Persian Cossacks and the rising of the tribesmen
policy; against the Sykes Mission and the South Persia Rifles showed
June 1918. ^ existence in the country of a strong and widespread anti-
British movement.
On the 11 th June, after hearing of the invitation to Samsam,
Sir Charles Marling, who still hoped that the Shah might be
induced to appoint Vossuk, appealed to London for increased
forces to be sent from Mesopotamia to Hamadan. On the
14th he reported that the feeling in Tehran against Samsam
was strong and that, as Vossuk might still be brought into office
through pressure exercised by his supporters on the Shah, it
would be more than ever necessary for us to support Vossuk by
strengthening our force at Kazvin, so that we could if necessary
bring troops nearer to Tehran. On the 19th June Sir Charles
Marling again telegraphed that the efforts of Vossuks sup
porters seemed likely to succeed and, after recapitulating the
reasons for the Shah's persistent opposition to Vossuk, urged
most strongly that a much stronger force should be despatched
immediately into North-West Persia. Besides keeping the Enzeli
road open or meeting the improbable case of a Turkish advance
from Azerbaijan, the force should garrison Hamadan and Kazvin
in sufficient strength to permit the despatch of say 1,000 men
towards Tehran and another column to Isfahan if necessary.
On the 6 th June H.M. Government had expressed the opinion
that until General Dunsterville had consolidated his position
on the Kazvin-Enzeli road there should be no question of
British troops or of Bicharakoff and his Russians going to Baku.
But General Marshall was asked for his appreciation of the
situation, which he telegraphed on the 9th. This estimated
that the Turco-German strength in Trans-Caucasia and on the
borders of North-West Persia was very much greater than the
forces likely to oppose them, and it pointed out that, owing to
the length and nature of General Dunsterville’s communications,
it would be impossible to maintain a British force north 0
Hamadan of sufficient strength to withstand a Turkish south- 1
easterly advance from Tabriz. Such an advance worn,
however, probably raise Persian national feeling against t e
Turks. General Marshall considered that the mobile mo or
column* then on its way should experience no difficulty m
holding the Kazvin-Enzeli road and in thus opening communi
cation with Baku, which place General Dunsterville considere
* 1,000 rifles, 2 mountain guns and a few machine guns, all carried in ^
Ford vans.