مجموعة ٦/ ١٠ "شؤون الحجاز ونجد: الوضع المالي والداخلي" [ظ‎‎٤‎٣] (١٣١٠/٩٣)

Neid rebellion in 1929, are only too well known to His Majesty s Government.
\lthough considerable sums have been collected from pilgrims < ui mg the last two
months there are the usual signs of financial stringency. The Legation even had
to appeal to the good offices of the Deputy Minister for horeign Afiairs tor pay
ment of the balance due to the Eastern Telegraph Company (Limited) for the >
period ending the 31st January; the Saudi Government paid €1,000 and left 0
over £ 2,000 outstanding. . ... ,. „ . , .
5 The main difficulty is that in spite of his policy ot economic development
Ibn Sand is still dependent almost entirely, either directly or indirectly, on the
pilgrimage as a source of revenue. It is nearly a year now since theie seemed to be
Ground for hope that oil would shortly be discovered in Hasa in commercial
quantities, but this hope has not been fulfilled, though it is true that it has not
been abandoned. The Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate ha\e discovered a gold
mine, or rediscovered an old one, with gold m what would oidmanlv be paying
quantities but the water which would make it possible to work the mine on an
economic basis has not yet been found. The Petroleum Development (Western
Arabia) (Limited), which has begun to prospect for oil along the coastal belt of
the Reel Sea has no good news to report. It is true that the prospectors have not
been at work long, and it must also be remembered that an American company
found oil at Bahrein where the Shell Company had given up the search, but the
reports from the company’s experienced geologists, who seem to have covered
most of the ground, have left the Jedda manager very gloomy. Two other possible
sources of wealth can be foreseen at present: that oil will be found in the
Rub’-al-Khali, and that somewhere in such parts of Arabia as are not included
in the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate’s concession gold or some other valuable
mineral will be found in quantities and in conditions that will repay the working.
There can be little in the commercial schemes which are discussed in the Mecca
press from time to time. It is not by selling to pilgrims small boxes of Medina
dates that the Saudi budget will be made to meet at the back, nor by curing rather
less badly the few skins the country has to export. Several grandiose schemes,
which in succession raised Saudi hopes, have come to nothing. The chief of these
were the Jedda-Mecca Railway, the Saudi State Bank, which the ex-Khedive was
supposed to be prepared to establish, and the loan of half a million or so which
the Saudi Government hoped they could raise in England on rather vague
security.
6 . For the present, then, the Saudi Government are living on the pilgrimage
revenues supplemented by windfalls, such as advances in respect of the various
concessions, the purchase by the Italian Government of an unknown number of
camels at absurdly high prices, and consignments of arms, petrol, &c., for which
they have never paid. Thus, windfalls apart, Saudi Arabia is dependent upon a
source of revenue on which not even the Hejaz alone had to live before the war,
for there seems to be no doubt that the Ottoman Government put into the Hejaz,
in the way of subsidies and in overhead expenses, more than they ever got out of
it. The country being dependent upon the pilgrimage, the size of the pilgrimage
is of the first importance. The fluctuations of this manifestation of religious
enthusiasm are well known to vou. 1 he total of overseas pilgrims this vear was
about 50,000. In 1927 it rose to 132,000, and in 1933 it fell to 21,000. The
number of pilgrims falls in times of economic stress, but it is also affected by
national policy and social changes, as in Soviet Russia, Turkey and Persia. No
>o\iet citizens, and very few Turkish, now come on the pilgrimage, and the
number of Persians is diminishing. Statements made recently in the course of
conversation by members of the Persian and Afghan Legations in Jedda suggest
that their Governments regard the pilgrimage as a useless drain upon the national
resources. On the other hand, it seems likely that the increasing feeling of Arab
so idarity will help to maintain, if not to increase, the number of pilgrims from
BYTE oyna and I alestine and perhaps Iraq, while in Moslem countries under
European rule not only will the authorities be careful not to take any action
mi rtht )e interpreted as interference with the pilgrimage, but nationalist
eelmg will probably tend to encourage the pilgrimage by using religious to
supplement political feeling. But it seems unlikely that the average number of
pilgrims will increase to such a point as to enable Ibn Saud to reduce the
oppressive pilgrim dues which he would doubtless be glad to do not only because
he would be exposed to less criticism, but for religious reasons too.