ملف ٢٧٦٤/١٩٠٤ الجزء ٤ "سكة حديد بغداد: المفاوضات الأنجلو-تركية؛ اقتراحات الحكومة التركية؛ وضع الكويت" [و‎‎٢‎٠] (٦٧٤/٤٤)

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty’s Govern™^*]
[A]
ASIATIC TURKEY AND ARABIA. [May 22.]
CONFIDENTIAL.
Section 1,
[ 21766 ] No. 1.
v India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 22.)
Sir, India Office, May 21, 1912.
I AM directed By the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of
yonr letter of the 16th instant on the subject of the Bagdad Railway and connected
questions.
In reply I am to say that if, after the very full discussions that have already taken
place, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs considers that a further inter
departmental conference is necessary, the Marquess of Crewe will depute a
representative of this Office to attend it. But, personally, he considers it sufficiently
established that, regard being had to the magnitude of British interests involved,
this country cannot with dignity, or, indeed, with safety, agree to participate on a
basis of less than 50 per cent., and he has always regarded the distribution of
60 per cent, between Great Britain, France, and Russia (or between the first
two alone) as a wholly unacceptable, and even dangerous, alternative. Further, he
holds very strongly the view of his predecessor (see paragraph 9 of Sir R. Ritchie’s
letter of the 29th March, 1911) that a friendly agreement with Germany is an essential
preliminary to a satisfactory settlement, and I am to suggest that the Bagdad Railway
Company and the German Government should at once be approached with a view to
such a modification of the declaration of the 7th March, 1911, as would enable this
country to participate in the Bagdad-Bussorah branch to an extent more nearly
proportionate to our commercial interests in that region.]
As regards El Katr, I am to say that, in Lord Crewe’s opinion, an entirely new
situation would be created in the Persian Gulf, and one in every way detrimental to
British interests, if the Turks were allowed to consolidate themselves there. Such
consolidation is, indeed, contradictory of the main object of His Majesty’s Government
in attempting a settlement of questions in the Gulf, which was to eliminate Turkish
influence as far as possible, and in any case to limit it to the head of the Gulf. That
influence in El Hasa has existed only since Midhat Pasha’s expedition in 1871, and
may be said to exist at present on sufferance, for so long as the quasi-independence of
Koweit is maintained, El Hasa must remain more or less isolated. But the construction
of the Bagdad Railway to Bussorah or Koweit will undoubtedly enable the Turkish
Government to make their authority much more effective; and the further result of
allowing, under the sanction of a convention, the consolidation of Turkish power in
the Peninsula of El Katr will, his Lordship thinks, be not only to enable the Turkish
Government to extend and establish it in the interior, but also to give them a secure
and recognised yoint dapyai within the British sphere of interest. The position of
Bahrein—as a kind of British enclave in Turkish territory—will be anomalous and
precarious, while the Trucial Coast will become the scene of constant intrigues
requiring increased vigilance—and therefore increased expenditure—on the part of
His Majesty’s Government to check it. Moreover, the Turkish desire, to intervene
jointly with us in the affairs of the Gulf will be strengthened, and will amount to
something like a claim if Turkish authority is once recognised and effective.
In Lord Crewe’s opinion, no convention, however strictly drawn, can remove
these disadvantages. He apprehends that the Turks will always intrigue ; that when
taxed with it they will deny it or produce sufficiently plausible excuses; while His
Majesty’s Government, with their many commitments elsewhere, will always have
sufficient reason for not taking at any given moment an extreme step which would
not be the less inconvenient or expensive merely because it happened to be justified
by the terms of the convention. The Turkish garrison at El Bidaa—unrecognised for
forty years, but, nevertheless, in possession—may, indeed, be regarded as a symbol of
British policy in the Persian Gulf.
Turning now to Mohammerah, Lord Crewe understands that the ffurks are
advancing extravagant claims, in the hope, by subsequent concessions there, of
obtaining corresponding advantages elsewhere ; and in your letter under reply the
[2485 i/—11