ملف ٥٣ /١٩١٥ الجزء ٦ "الحرب: المملكة العربية؛ المطالبات الإيطالية" [و‎‎١‎٦‎٢] (٣٦٠/٣٢٨)

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ITALY.
War Aims.
X
“ITALY’S RIGHTS OVERSEA. THE NEAR EAST.”
L’Idea Nazionale (August 16) lias another leading article
on “Italy’s Rights Oversea,” this time on “ The Partition of
the Near East.” It begins by drawing a rather highly-
coloured picture of the “programmes of expansion,” which
the conquests and military enterprises of the Allies now fairly
c early delineate. Russia is to have virtual possession of
Northern Persia, to possess Armenia, and parts of N W \sia
Minor, Constantinople, and the Dardanelles; “England in the
changed character of her dominion in Egypt has, as we have
ahead} pointed out, actually realised a design which seemed
fantastic—viz., the possession of the Eastern gate of the
Mediterranean and of the route to the East. This fact, gigan-
tie m its effects, would alone suffice to compensate her for
the sacrifices of the war.” But besides this she has extended
her influence over all the Arabian coast with the exception
of lemen . The command of the Persian Gulf gives her
he control of the other route to the East. She has occupied
Kerman to secure the Indian frontier and Ahwaz for the sake
oi its oil, and brought the greater part of Mesopotamia under
hei rule These successes constitute the most brilliant solu
tion of the Eastern Question that England could hope for from
every point of view.
Prance has intensified her activity on the Syrian coast and
consolidated her protectorate of the Syrian Catholics, thus
securmg a set-off to the British possession of Egypt and
r il 16 80 ^ hern c °ast of Asia Minor—from Smyrna to the
Alexandretta—which remains unclaimed, is thus
mr lffl 0U f t a ! Ita , y S . sphere of actio11 ’ to balance not so
m ,h the territorial gams of her Allies as the effects of those
TJT t T Sla l e ! ltry into the Mediterranean, the closing
Fninl’ e r0Ute . t0 tlu : Red Sea and Indian Ocean through
:X md 8 ann exation of Egypt, and of the only alternative
ment n r occ npation of Syria, and the establish-
pR 0 , f PX? 181 m fluence on the coast of Arabia. By all these
Fnfhre Ita o S & Mediterranean Power and as possessor of
triflil t “h Somaha ’ 18 ? losel y touched. She makes no
soutk g nf 4 ] lflCe \ U , abandoning all aspirations to the territory
X y exandretta as far as the Egyptian frontier,” and
infli h> ncejon^the^ Mcfslem'^vorl Une With ^^t
War Aims.
2 5 ^ /^/X.
ITALY.
ITALY S CLAIMS IN THE EAST
corXptS ^
Government should lose no’fim S - 10 Gay d a ) urging that the
ing with the Affies on th P u , to an nnderstand-
Balkans and Asia Minor. ^ 10n ° ^ taly S ^ n t ere sts in the
to H tL te tXTan US represti&ts statem “‘
that between England and Rnssl^ r 7 V1Slted ^ndon
reached regarding Persiarnid^fbe 1 ^ 1 9 , perfec ^ accord had been
fact that at presfntTthe « ilf h ^ fnerally, and (2) “the
to be a resumption of exchange 1 of vf d AU R g f ^ tW is said
Cabinets.” excHange of views between the Allied
it looks 0t asT^th^Pa^t^ seems ,. to have been absent, and
a ^
for^rtalv " f ’/ no ‘ nierel r national, but also European- and
ocop^’Xr dtlaS' X “ SeXaSX-r
seems to^r^achtg^L^I S” £ STXo’f t
She ought “toTa^f 1 *’ “g 11 X are Xu‘ toXve t
her Oriental 0 Sff ^ ^ alheS an ex P Iicit recognition of
kelv tffiof ll n-- 6 ^-!'! A f re S ards the Balkans—it seems
iKely that Salomki will not be restored to Greece but inter
kintelnd Jd ° f aI * ‘ he ° 0Untries of ’ the Balt an
Hinterland and of the European countries. This idea thnncb
no expressed, is diffused in many European capitals The
commercial and cultural effects of such an arrangement* would
be very great, and Italy must have her part in Se matter
Then there is the question of the southern limits of the new
Serbia,, and finally of Constantinople and the Straits and
aZ^LraSa“rower. Medi ‘ erranean ’ WhiCh a8eC ‘ S Ita1 ^ as
andai^APiM- 8 " 6 . “ f eat .f etail int o the question of Italy’s
and the Allies interests, railway concessions, and spheres of
England 6 R A - ia w m ° r - B j fore thc war the four Powers—
a pMnd, Russia France, and Germany—had reached a defi
nitive agreement by means of reciprocal concessions. This
agreement is important because it provides a ready-made
Am™J°\ the r'\ a ¥?T ent Under discussion among the
‘ . e8 w bich is to substitute actual possession for concessions
of influence in Asiatic Turkey-Germany’s share being appa!
rently assigned to France.
Italy came late to Asia Minor, and only obtained a condi-
fromtbp n r eS R 0n /S r r eparat0 P' work of the southern coast
from the Gu f of Budrum as far as Adana. And even this
nas contested by her neighbours—by the Germans, who did
not want to see Italy in Cilicia (in spite of the Triple Alli-
ance) by the Austrians, and further by.the English, who
kpd 1 f° keep Ital y ° ut of Gulf of Budrum, and who
talked of a plot on the part of the Triple Alliance to get
command of the Eastern Mediterranean.
It seemed that there was no place for Italy in Asia Minor
while she formed part of the Triple Alliance! But now the
position is changed Italy has taken her part in the war
a “ d ha8 a n ? h t to her part in the settlement. England was
x liberal in her offers to Greece earlier in the war; and
Italy ought surely to rank before Greece. The correspondent
concludes by again urging that Italian troops should be sent
to Salomki as a symbol of ItalyX interests in the Eastern
question.
An editorial note is appended to this article underlining
that ^thT C 06 t0 Gre e ce v ^d refusing to believe it possible
that th® Government of Salandra can have neglected in
Apni, 1915, to obtain guarantees for Italian interests in thy
East, or that the Allies can expect Italy to establish eaoh'of
her c laims by some fresh ent erprise a nd fresh sacrifices.
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