مجموعة ٢٨ /٦٧ "بلاد فارس: تقارير سنوية، ١٩٣٢-" [و‎‎١‎٤] (٦٤٤/٢٧)

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Imperial Airways. Whether the offer became an accomplished fact was
immaterial. The important point was that it should be made. At the same time
he deprecated a suggestion that had been made by Imperial Airways that they
should offer to fill the breach made by Junkers’ disappearance by running a
Bagdad-Tehran service for three months without subsidy. His Majesty’s
Government considered, however, that this offer would not only indicate too great
— a dependence upon the Persian coast route, and thereby whet the appetite of the
i'ersian Government, but would amount to paying a commercial price for the use
of the route, which would in its way be as objectionable as paying a political
price. His Majesty’s Government were also beginning to incline to the view that
the Arab coast route possessed unsuspected advantages, especially as it had been
discovered that it could be operated by land machines, and thought that the cost
of transfer would be no greater, and probably less, than the cost of a subsidy.
136. His Majesty’s Minister was therefore instructed to deliver the
message originally proposed. This was a matter of some delicacy, as
Teymourtache had unquestionably thought throughout that His Majesty’s
Government were willing to discuss the question of Imperial Airways along with
the questions involved in the general treaty, and had probably granted the two
months’ extension from the 31st March to the 31st May in the belief that His
Majesty’s Government were considering his suggestion for a continuance of
Imperial Airways in return for a voluntary relinquishment of Henjam. The
question was yet further complicated by the fact that the necessary arrangements
for the transfer of the air route to the Arab coast were still incomplete, and that
a final extension of Imperial Airways’ permission was required, if possible, to
the 1st October.
137. After these difficulties had been considered by His Majesty’s
Government, the message was delivered on the 22nd May, a request for a four
months’ extension being made at the same time. Teymourtache was told that,
though the decision to move was definite, His Majesty’s Government would expect
to receive the same facilities as other Powers if in the future the Arab coast
route failed to come up to expectations. He received the communication without
comment, and undertook to consult the Council of Ministers about the four
months’ extension. This was granted three days later. It is possible that the
refusal to link Imperial Airways with the treaty in general or Henjam in
particular may have convinced Teymourtache that His Majesty’s Government
were not so dependent on Persian goodwill as he had supposed. It is equally
possible that the fact that he had got rid of Imperial Airways without having to
give any sort of promise about Henjam may have encouraged him to think that
he could as easily get rid of Henjam in due course.
138. At this meeting (the seventh) the nature of the facilities required by
His Majesty’s Government at Henjam was discussed in some detail, and His
Majesty’s Minister endeavoured to show not only that these were entirely
commonplace, involving nothing in the nature of a base, but also that there was no
reason why the Persian and British fleets should not share the advantages that
Henjam afforded. Teymourtache made it pretty clear that if something could
be done to satisfy Persian amour-yropre over Bahrein (he kept reverting to Tamb,
which His Majesty’s Minister kept repeating was out of the question), Henjam
should present no difficulty. His Majesty’s Minister in turn made it clear that
without Henjam there was no prospect of His Majesty’s Government concluding
a treaty. The discussion revolved on these lines for some hours, without any
definite result, but, at the end, Teymourtache took a pencil and scribbled what
he called “ all sorts of nonsense ” to the following effect:—
{a) Frontier rectification in Baluchistan.
\b) Payment by His Majesty’s Government to the Persian Government of
some of "the income tax derived from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.
(c) Assistance in the purchase of military aeroplanes.
(d) A promise of assistance in the purchase of warships, if the Persian
Government added to their squadron, which was not their present
intention. *i .v. .
(e) A promise of goodwill in the event of the Persian Government wishing
to raise a foreign loan in the future.