مجموعة ٢٨ /٦٧ "بلاد فارس: تقارير سنوية، ١٩٣٢-" [و‎‎١‎٤‎٨] (٦٤٤/٢٩٥)

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impression that, while the Iranian Government did not seem to have aban one
hopes of securing recognition of their “rights” to the thalweg, it migi >e
possible to induce them to accept the 1913-14 frontier so long as some sateguar
could be introduced under which Iran would always enjoy the undisturbed
usufruct of the entire waterway.
259. It having been decided that the direct negotiations should take place
in Tehran, Nuri Pasha, accompanied by the Iraqi Minister of Justice,
Mr. Edmonds and Colonel Ward, arrived there on the 5th August. JNun s
instructions had only been drawn up at the last minute and, in effect, th e y limited
him to doing little more than make an extended enquiry designed to secure
acceptance of possible heads of agreement, the details of which would be woiked
out later. In particular, he had no authority to seek Iranian agreement to the
complete draft Conservancy Board Convention, nor to make any definite proposal
in regard to the Abadan anchorage.
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260. The Tehran negotiations pursued a course so tortuous that they almost
defy summary. They opened with an oral statement made by M. Kazemi on the
8th August that—
(a) The Iranian Government accepted the existing land frontier,
(b) They asked for no alteration in the Shatt-el-Arab frontier, but did not
wish this fact to be stated in any written document, and
(c) The 1932 Conservancy Board draft would need further study by him
before the next meeting. M. Kazemi implied, however, that the
Iranian Government would not object to British participation.
The following day M. Kazemi spoke to His Majesty’s Minister about point (b)
above and, after stating that the Iraqis found difficulty m agreeing to this
conspiracy of silence, asked whether the Foreign Office could ui gently suggest
some formula that would satisfy both parties.
261. On the 12th August, however, M. Kazemi executed a typical volte face
and put forward written proposals for a Treaty of Friendship and a bipartite
Conservancy Convention, the terms of which presupposed a thalweg or median
line frontier. Under the latter convention, moreover, each side would appoint
two members to the board, which might then co-opt a fifth membei of anothei
nationality.
262. Nuri Pasha’s reply to this was to hand to M. Kazemi a proces-verbal,
containing proposals for the recognition of the 1913-14 line and for the establish
ment of a conservancy board, the third member of which would be nominated by
His Maiesty’s Government in the United Kingdom. Nuri Pasha at the same
time explained to His Majesty’s Minister that his instructions did not permit
him to suggest definitely that His Majesty’s Government should also be a
signatory of the convention.
263. The next act opened with the receipt on the 15th August of a telegram
from the Foreign Office stating that a formula of the kind suggested by
M Kazemi was probably unattainable, and suggesting that the only satisfactory
solution was a redefinition of the whole frontier. It might, however, be possible
so to dress up the wording of the Conservancy Board Convention and the other
subsidiary agreements that the whole transaction might seem on the face of it to
be an Iranian success. Nuri Said proved willing enough to accept this suggestion,
but M Kazemi declared that it was quite unacceptable, though he and the 1 rime
Minister later implied that they would be willing to redefine the entire frontier
on condition that Iran should be permanently safeguarded against the with
drawal by Iraq of privileges accorded under the Conservancy Convention and
allied agreements. The atmosphere of qualified optimism created by this advance
was, however, short-lived, for M. Feroughi and M. Kazemi soon retreated again
and'once more began talking about sovereignty.
264. Nuri Said was by now thoroughly despondent and accordingly sent
M. Kazemi a letter summing up the position, stating that his presence was now
required at Geneva and asking for an audience to take leave ot the Shah.
M Kazemi’s reply either denied or took back every previous statement made on
the Iranian side which seemed at all hopeful, and generally misrepresented the
situation.
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