مجموعة ٢٨ /٦٧ "بلاد فارس: تقارير سنوية، ١٩٣٢-" [و‎‎٢‎٩‎٧] (٦٤٤/٥٩٣)

15
instructions from Moscow, asked for further information about the proposed
Higher Supplies Committee. It was clear that the Soviet Government were
afraid that they might be voted down. The British and American representatives
explained that the committee would not vote and would have no executive powers,
but would only try to ascertain Persia’s resources and needs and the possibility
of meeting these needs from Allied sources. In the course of June the American
^Charge d'Affaires communicated to the Soviet Ambassador a scheme by the
American Director of Road Transport(') in the north. The Soviet Ambassador
promised to study this, but he was guarded and tended to throw doubt on the need
for Americans. No further meetings were held pending the reactions of the Soviet
Government to the proposal made. No reply was ever given, but what with the
Soviet oil dispute with the Persian Government on the one hand, and on the other
the improvement in the grain situation and the better war news, both the
feasibility of the scheme and the need for it diminished.
60. In 1944 Persia was the one country where British, American and
Soviet civil and military authorities met on a broad land front and the necessary
contacts at the various technical levels proceeded reasonably smoothly and
efficiently, in spite of the difficulties in the political sphere. One excellent reason
for this was, of course, that ‘ ‘ Aid to Russia ’ ’ through Persia really delivered the
goods during 1944.
The American Advisory Missions.
(a) General.
61. It is regrettable to have to report that the American Advisory Missions
did not on the whole do well in the course of the year, in spite of the strong
support given them by His Majesty’s Embassy, who cannot envisage the possibility
of their disappearance with equanimity, since this must inevitably increase the
chaos and corruption in Persian administration which in turn might give the
Russians a pretext to step in.
62. In the course of the summer, His Majesty’s Government explained to
the United States Government that they were most anxious for the missions to
remain and in certain cases to be strengthened, since they were convinced that
Persia’s need for foreign assistance would continue to be great, particularly in
the immediate post-war period; they were specially concerned about the future
of the Persian police. When Allied troops are withdrawn, a large measure of
responsibility for internal security would fall on the police, which in its present
state was quite unable to bear it; this might have particularly serious consequences
in the oil refinery area. His Majesty’s Government were anxious, therefore, that
reforms should be put in hand before the departure of British troops. This could
not be carried out without foreign assistance and they would prefer that this
should be provided by the United States if possible, 'if, however, the United
States Government felt unable to provide it, His Majesty’s Government would
have to consider advising the Persian Government to look elsewhere. The State
Department replied that the United States Government were not losing interest
in Persia, but they had no fixed policy of retaining advisory missions there. They
had, for instance, always made it clear to the Persian Government that American
advisers must not be exposed to vilification. If attacked the Persian Government
must defend them, otherwise they would be withdrawn and would not be replaced
The United States Government had now decided that:—
(1) Colonel Schwartzkopf and his five assistants would be left for a further
year with the gendarmerie.
(2) They would investigate whether Colonel Schwartzkopf might take over
the police as well.
(3) General Ridley would remain until the 1st March, 1945. by which date
the United States War Department thought that he would have done
everything possible to accomplish his task ; the War Department would
probably decline to appoint a successor and were inclined to con
centrate on the gendarmerie and police.
63. His Majesty s Charge d’Affaire’s comment on these decisions was that
if General Ridley left in March 1945, he would not have accomplished all the
work covered by his contract and that such work as he had achieved would in
any case be rapidly undone if he left. Mr. Lascelles went on to discuss how far
the possession of an efficient army would really be useful and necessary to Persia
( l 2 3 ) For the management of road transport .