مجموعة ٣٠/ ٣٣ "الخليج الفارسي، الساحل المتصالح. سياسة حكومة بريطانيا. قائمة شيوخ الساحل المتصالح" [و‎‎٤‎٢] (٨١٨/٨٣)

ioiotf that there is a drop of oil in the whole of the hinterland
Three years a^o before oil oame into the picture we were in
different to affaire in the hinterland, and three years hence -
if in the meantime it ia proved by exploration that there is no
oil there - we shall he equally indifferent* To adopt there
fore any form of close administration, or closer control, in
the hinterland, merely to enable Petroleum Concessions limited
to judge whether there is oil in the hinterland or not, seems
to me distinctly not worth the candle. In order to get
Petroleum concessions Limited parties into the interior we
should therefore in ray opinion continue with our present policy
□low as it may prove, of negotiation, and trust to the power
of Petroleum Concessions Limited money bags to bring round the
Ch&ikhs in time.
(k) as you are aware I am of the opinion that oil on
the Arab side of the £ulf from the strategical point of view
is of first-rate importance owing to the uncertainty of its
supply from the Persian side in time of war, and I have ta*en
various opportunities of expressing this opinion to the India
Office and the Government of India. If therefore as a result
of Petroleum concessions Limited exploration oil is found in
the hinterland an entirely new situation will in my view be
created. This situation will presumably develop in two
stages. In the first Petroleum Concessions Limited will
declare that in such and such areas experimental drilling is
worth while. This will involve tne importation of machinery,
the forming a Petroleum Concessions Limited camp or camps, and
so forth, and to effect these we will probably have to take
on some fresh commitments in the interior. At the same time
care /