مجموعة ٣٠/ ٣٣ "الخليج الفارسي، الساحل المتصالح. سياسة حكومة بريطانيا. قائمة شيوخ الساحل المتصالح" [و‎‎٤‎٠‎٢] (٨١٨/٨٠٣)

though it transpired in the air reconnaissance of the Gulf in 1027 that he
attaches great importance to avoiding action which might be unpalatable to
the Wahabi King.
11. The activity of the Wahabis again came prominently to notice in
1926. The Political Resident then reported- 0 that of the Trucial Chiefs,
the Sheikhs of Abu Dhabi and Dabai, together with a number of the tribes
under their suzerainty or adjoining their territory, were whole-heartedly
opposed to Ibn Sand ; that the Sheikhs of Shargah and Ras-al-Khaima were
definitely supporters of the \\ ahabi King ; and that the Sheikhs of Ajman
and Umin al Qaiwain were inclined to be neutral. In a number of instances
the Wahabi Governor of llasa, Ibn Jiluwi, appeared to have acted in an
extremely high-handed manner in the frucial Sheikhdoms, and the Political
Resident was inclined to the view that he aimed at the absorption in Nejd
of all Trucial Oman and “ Independent ” Oman (Jau), and at the establish
ment of contact with a large district of the Oman Sultanate which was
opposed to the Imam and almost independent of the Sultan.
12. An element of doubt existed as to the extent to which Ibn Sand
was personally responsible for. or even cognisant of, the activities of the
Governor of Hasa; it was decided, after considerable discussion, that no
action should be taken in the matter pending the conclusion of the new
treaty then in negotiation with him ;t| and the assurances secured in that
treaty from the King were ultimately held to dispose of the matter.
13. The Government of India were strongly in favour of the inclusion in
the treaty in question of an undertaking as regards the Trucial Chiefs
substantially identical with that embodied in the Treaty of 26th December
1915 (see para. 9 above). It proved impossible to secure Ibn Sand’s
agreement to this His Majesty’s Government regarded the point as one
which it was undesirable to press too far, and in the result the King of the
Hejaz and Nejd, in the treaty signed at Jeddah on 20th May 1927, undertook
merely 44 to maintain iriendiy and peaceful relations with . . . the
Sheikhs of Katr and the Oman coast who are in special treaty relations
with His Majesty’s Government.”
14. The result of the reconnaissance undertaken in connection with the
air route in the Persian Gulf along the north Arabian shore in the spring
of 1927 was to show that the influence of Ibn Sand had increased in a very
marked manner along the north Arabian littoral, and considerable difficulties
were placed in the way of the reconnaissance on the ground, either expressed
or implied, that political difficulties would be caused with the Wahabis and
the Wahabi King by the landing of aeroplanes, Ac. (cp. Note on Air
Communications in the Gulf on p. S|j. So impressed was the Political
Resident by the rise of the Wahabi power and by the insecurity to
which a chain of air stations along the Arab coast might be exposed by
internal dissensions and the danger of Wahabi interference in the petty
Sheikhdoms of the Trucial Coast, that in the spring of 1927 he suggested 0
that the long-established policy of abstention by His Majesty’s Government
from all but naval commitments should now be discarded and replaced by a
definite assumption of responsibility in the States concerned for the orderly
succession of Sheikh to Sheikh, for his maintenance in power, and for the
protection of his territories by land as well as by sea.
15. The Government of India gave careful and sympathetic consideration
to the Resident’s proposals. But the conclusion at which the}* finally arrivedt
was that, even though the guarantees of non-interference given by Ibn Sand
in the Treaty of Jeddah of 1927 fell considerably short of those which he
had been prepared to accept in 1915, they conveyed to the King of the
Hejaz a clear intimation, solemnly accepted by him, of the special position
and of the interest in the Trucial Sheikhdoms of liis Majesty s Government.
Past history, in the view of the Government of India, justified them in
relying for security against, the danger of Wahabi encroachments on the
treaty engagements into which Ibn Sand had entered with His Majesty’s
Government, and, while it was impossible to forecast the effect on Gulf
politics of the death of Ibn Sand, they were not prepared, in these circum
stances, to make an immediate reversal of their policy in the Persian Gulf
Letter from Pol.
Res. to G. of I.,
156 S, May 9 1927,
E. and O. 7483.
** هذه التواريخ تقريبية Desp. to C.O.,
June 9 1926,
P. 2433/26.
ft S. of S. for I. to
Viceroy, 2248,
Aug. 2*1 1926,
P. 2749.
P. 831/27.
XX M r - Jordan to
Sir A. Chamberlain,
Jan.26 1927, para. 11,
P. 494/27.
P. 3269/27
* Desps. N'os. 137 S.
and 156 S. to G. of I.,
April 30 and May 9
1927, P. 3996.
f Desp. to S. of S.
for J., 13, Sept. 8
1927, P. 4575/27.