ملف ٣٦٦٥\١٩٢٤ الجزء ١ "الجزيرة العربية:- الوضع ١٩٢٤. الهجوم الوهابي على الحجاز. الاستيلاء على الطائف وهزيمة جيش الحجاز. تنازل الملك حسين عن العرش." [و‎‎٨‎٤] (٨٥٢/١٧٦)

and this is supported by fairly reliable information that the seven men who had been
held to ransom have been released and are allowed to move about freely in Taif. It
may be mentioned here that the detention of these men is believed to have been a
method of recovering from King Hussein a sum of £7,000 which he extorted from a
Wahabi who used to act as banker in Mecca for his compatriots. The ransom was
never sent out to Taif, because King Hussein refused to allow any messenger to pass
out to the hostile force.
6. There is some hope that if the "Wahabis take Mecca they will behave better
than they did at Taif. In the five weeks that have elapsed since the capture of
Taif, Ibn Saud has had time to receive the news and to issue orders, and it is not to
be expected that he will allow indiscriminate massacre and pillage in the Holy City.
It is not known whether the two letters despatched to the Wahabi leader in Taif by
this agency ever reached him; the messenger, a reliable Bedouin who is habitually
entrusted with large sums of money, has not returned. When the Hedjaz force was
finally defeated, a letter addressed to the Wahabi leader informing him that he
would be held responsible for any harm to the lives or property of foreign subjects
was drawn up and signed by the British, French, Italian, Dutch and Persian repre
sentatives, and each of them has sent out one or more copies (I have despatched copies
by four different hands) in the hope that at least one may reach its destination.
7. The situation is better to this extent, that the delay has given many foreign
subjects time to leave the country. Some 600 Indian pilgrims (including 150
destitutes from previous years) left for Bombay on the 1st October, and about 200
more who have since arrived from Mbdina should leave for India on the 15th October.
A party of 150—the last of the season, it is hoped—arrived at Ma an from Medina
a few days ago, and the High Commissioner, Jerusalem, has been informed that they
would do well to go home via Suez without touching Jeddah, where they might have
to wait weeks for a steamer. About 400 pilgrims, of whom many were British
Malays, left for Singapore on the 6th October, and some 500 more will sail on the
13th October. And, finally, 850 Takrunis (exclusive of children under 6) have been
sent to Suakin by dhow at the expense of the Nigerian Repatriation Fund. If it
came to an evacuation after the 15th October, we should have only British residents
to deal with, with perhaps a few pilgrims who have not yet reached Jeddah from
Mecca or Medina. Fortunately, the possibility of evacuation seems far more remote
than it did a month ago. Not only does the sacking of Mecca seem less probable, but
the tribes near Jeddah seem less likely to give trouble. These tribes have no longer
such obvious cause to pillage Jeddah, because the authorities here have very wisely
abandoned King Hussein’s" senseless blockade'policy, and are allowing the Bedouin
to buy food-stuffs freely. Moreover, the flight to Jeddah of all the shereefs, many of
whom had personal tribal followings of some importance, has^ given the small tribes
of this neighbourhood a respect for the Wahabis which tends to keep them quiet.
And, finally, the British and French warships, which have recently been joined by
two Italian “ sloops ” (formerly British trawlers), have certainly had a stabilising
influence. There is no longer a daily panic at the rumour that H.M.S. Clematis
is going to bombard the town, but the knowledge that the ships are there helps to
maintain law and order. The local authorities, whose police and watchmen are
inadequate in quality, if not in number, have not hesitated to use the presence of
the ships to give them moral authority, and have let it be known—without
authorisation, it is hardly necessary to say—that, if a single foreign subject is
injured, Jeddah will be shelled by the warships immediately. It is satisfactory to
be able to state that, in spite of the waves of panic which have swept over the town
at frequent intervals, law and order have been maintained very well indeed.
8. It is early to make any serious forecast about the new regime. Indeed, the
new regime can hardly be said to have begun, since King Hussein is still in the
country. There are signs of his departure to-day or to-morrow, but, until he has
actually left, Ali will continue to be a cypher and no serious work will be begun.
There is a feeling of great satisfaction at King Hussein’s abdication, to the relief at
the removal of a heavy despotism being added the conviction that the chief, if not
the only, obstacle to good relations with Ibn Saud has been removed. Ali’s position
is not enviable. He seems to have been put into power by a. small group of officials
in opposition to the wishes of a strong party which did not want to commit the
country to continued support of the sbereefian family, and even his supporters would
probably sacrifice him if he proved to be displeasing to Ibn Saud or if he refused to
follow their advice. As to the latter, there is little fear, for Ali is as weak and
irresolute as his father is obstinate and determined.
[752 dd—1] B 2