مجموعة ١٨/١٧(٢) "عمليات التهريب بين الكويت والعراق" [و‎‎٩‎٤] (٨٨٩/١٨٧)

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he would sell it for about twice that amount. The fact was that Koweit had
become a recognised market where Arabs, whether would-be smugglers or not,
went to purchase arms. He was quite prepared to believe that the British
authorities in the Persian Gulf were right when they said that no arms entered
Koweit by sea, but it was absolutely certain that somehow or other these arms were
^available for sale in Koweit.
Mr. Baxter said that His Majesty’s Government would certainly be prepared
to give the whole question their earnest attention if the Iraqi Government would,
in fact, be good enough to produce all the evidence in their possession.
At a later stage in the discussion, Major Edmonds suggested that His
Majesty’s Government might be prepared to consider a solution whereby substan
tial restrictions would be placed on the sale of arms in the Koweiti market. He
thought that in Muscat, before the war, His Majesty’s Government had insisted
that all the arms available for sale in that territory should be collected and stored
in one special warehouse under Government supervision, and that the sale of these
arms should be subjected to some form of Government control. He suggested that
some such system in Koweit might be the most effective method of dealing with
the situation which had arisen.
Mr. Baxter said that this suggestion would receive further consideration.
As regards other forms of smuggling, Mr. Baxter wished to point out in the
first place that it was really entirely for the Government of a country to see that
smuggling into its territory did not take place. The Iraqi Foreign Minister had
put forward three suggestions. The first was for a customs union between Iraq
and Koweit. This did not seem to His Majesty’s Government to be an acceptable
solution, since such an arrangement between a large State like Iraq and a small
State like Koweit might be expected to undermine the independence of the smaller
State.
Taufiq Suwaidi said that he did not think that there was much foundation
for this fear. He said that for many years now the Iraqi authorities had run the
Koweiti postal administration. This had not, he thought, made any difference
to the political position of the sheikhdom, and he did not see why it should make
any difference if the Iraqi authorities also took over the Koweiti customs
administration. Koweit would, of course, be offered a fixed annual sum in lieu
of its present customs revenue. He thought that the Koweitis themselves would
be very ready to accept such a suggestion.
Mr. Baxter said that the Iraqi Foreign Minister’s second suggestion, that
the northern frontier line of Koweit should be fixed further south so as to give
the Iraqi preventive services more space in which to operate, seemed also to be
unacceptable. This suggestion would apparently involve the cession to Iraq of
about one-third of Koweit, and it was difficult to see what compensation could
be given to the sheikh elsewhere.
Taufiq Suwaidi said that, if the suggestion of a customs union between
Iraq and Koweit were found to be possible, it would not be necessary further to
consider this alternative.
Mr. Baxter proceeded that, as regards the Iraqi Foreign Minister’s third
solution, he understood that the proposal of combined preventive operations had
already been put forward some months ago. The Sheikh of Koweit had stated on
that occasion that he was willing to negotiate with the Iraqi Government when
he had reached an agreement with the Saudi Government regarding the raising
of their blockade. These negotiations had been proceeding fairly satisfactorily
of late.
Taufiq Suwaidi interjected that he did not see what these negotiations
between Koweit and Saudi Arabia had to do with Iraq. In reply to the question
whether the Iraqi Government had any special measures in mind in connexion
with the proposed anti-smuggling agreement with Koweit, Taufiq Suwaidi seemed
to think that it might be possible to induce the sheikh, who had no armoured
cars, &c., to contribute to the proposed joint preventive operations, to share
the cost of these operations. It was pointed out to him that the sheikh would not
be likely to agree to any such proposal.