ملف ١٩٢٨/٢٠٠ الجزء ١٠ "بلاد فارس: العلاقات الأنجلو-فارسية: مفاوضات إبرام معاهدة" [و‎‎١‎٢‎٦] (٨٦٨/٢٥٢)

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY O
ITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT
7
PERSIA.
CONFIDENTIAL.
[E 6475/139/34]
6820
4 I Section
October 22. 1934.
ia Cvva c\rCA~ UfU.
So. 1.
No.
ir,
Sir R. Hoare to Sir John Simon.
443.)
?*~ f crJ* 'av7 ^ (£
(Received October 22.) ^
Tehran, September 29, 1934.
I HAVE the honour to transmit, herewith, a copy of the note which, in
accordance with your instructions. I handed to the Prime Minister to-day. His
Highness looked rather perturbed by its perusal and said that he knew nothing
whatever about the matter, and that it often happened that action was taken at
a distance from the capital without the instructions and without the knowledge
fc ^ en ^ ra ^ Government; it was also quite possible that the Persian naval
officeis knew nothing more about Tamb and Abu Musa than that Persia claims
sovereignty over them. I replied that it was impossible for us to act on the
assumption that the commander-in-chief of a naval force, whether great or small,
was not aware of the general political situation in the waters where he operated.
Moreover, as regards the second visit, it had taken place after our senior naval
omcer had explained our point of view to Lieutenant-Colonel Bayendor and after,
as we knew positively, there had been contact between the Persian sloops.
2. His Highness then asked whether I had any details of the conversation
between yourself and Bagher Khan Kazemi, and he expressed the hope that the
contact which had been established would prove valuable in promoting those
friendly relations which Persia should have with all countries, and more especially
with Great Britain, for whose work in the world he had the highest regard. I
replied by giving him a rough translation of your telegram No. 90 of the
26th September.
3. I went on to say I was rather puzzled as to what the wishes of the Persian
Government were in the matter of the treaty, explaining my bewilderment by a
short recital of events since, shortly after I went on leave last year, his Highness
told Mr. Mallet that relations had never been so good as they were at the moment
(see Mr. Mallet’s despatch No. 294 of the 17th June, 1933). ' There had then been
the Basidu flag and Mudir incidents. The flag incident, with regard to which
he must admit that we had been most moderate, was safely settled and the mudir
was still under discussion when the Evening Standard indiscretion occurred. I
discussed it strenuously with his Highness himself and the Minister for Foreio-n
Affairs, and after about three weeks it proved possible for me to have an audience
of the Shah. Our conversation seemed to show that His Majesty had almost
forgotten both incidents, and that what he had mainly in mind was that we should
get on with the treaty negotiations. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, not long
afterwards, told me that he was anxious to begin treaty discussions at an early
date, but gradually his interest entirely evaporated and in its place we had the
outrageous charge that we were stirring up disaffection in Baluchistan and
Mr. Christopher Sykes was nearly expelled as a suspect. Finally, I received from
Kazemi a letter on the subject of the negotiations which, though vaguely worded,
appeared to indicate that the Persian Government had decided to abandon them
Was his Highness surprised at my saying I was bewildered?
4. I went on to say that shortly before he left for London, Hussein Khan
Ala told me (I now remember it was Lieutenant-Colonel Loch) that the Persian
Government had been examining the draft treaty and had reached the conclusion
that much of it was unacceptable and that the negotiations would almost have to
begin afresh. His Highness replied that it was true that the treaty had been
re-examined, in October, he thought, and that it was considered that Persia was
being asked to give much away and was to receive little in return. I replied that
m my view Persia was being asked to surrender nothing concrete whatsoever—
claims, such as that to Bahrein, which she actually did not wish to see realised
and she would receive in return definite, even if small, practical benefits, and I
enquired whether the Shah was cognisant of the details of the draft treaty
[240 y 1]
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