أوراق اللجنة الشرقية التابعة لمجلس الحرب [و‎‎٩‎٦] (٥٤٤/١٩١)

3
important, and you should therefore send at least a section even should they take only
equipment ammunition. With such a small force at Krasnovodsk surely local supplies
can be purchased, but doubtless India will ask Malleson to persuade I rans-Caspian
authorities to assist in every way. It would be too much to expect Malleson to under
take responsibility for full supply of the force at present.
3. Crude oil is obtainable in sufficient quantities from Cheleken Island near
Krasnovodsk, but we are cabling fuller detail separately.
4. Your X. 1103 of the 12 th August.
In view of our success at Kazian in removing Bolshevik influence, doubtless you
will instruct Dunsterville not to hesitate to dispose similarly of any remaining Bolshevik
influence at Baku, if advisable. He will have our full support in this.
5. We cannot help feeling from Dunsterville’s telegrams that possible failure is
uppermost in his mind. He should be removed if he lacks the necessary determination
to see this difficult situation through, but it may be that he only requires encourage
ment, and in any action you think fit to take you will have our support.
Addressed Mesopotamia ; repeated India.
APPENDIX II.
E.C.-1154.
Sir R. Wingate to Mr. Balfour.—(Received August 12.)
(No. 1209.)
(Telegraphic.) Cairo, August 12, 1918.
BAGDAD telegram No. 6491 and preceding telegrams.
Following is my view of situation :—
Khurma affair as between King Hussein and Bin Sand is a manifestation of ancient
antipathy between Meccans and Wahabites. Both principalities are pledged to us, but
former is actively fighting Turks. Each desire to force a favourable issue that will
enable him to establish his position against the other. Bin Sand’s influence is largely
based on Wahabism, sect which (more especially in disturbed times like the present)
can combine reactionary and tortuous [?] fanatical [sic] elements, and become
unmanageable and dangerous.
King Hussein is keenly alive to this potential menace, and probably feels that
with our support Bin Saud and his sect might dominate Arabian politics. It will be
conceded, I trust, that such a consummation of Arab movement would be unsatisfactory
to Moslems generally and contrary to British interests and propaganda. On the other
hand, policy advocated from Cairo would be directed to secure priority of King
Hussein without prejudice to territoriel rights of other Arabian chiefs. King Hussein
represents his action at Khurma as necessary to indicate his impaired authority in the
East, and disclaims any aggressive designs on Bin Saud. I consider we must accept
these assurances and uphold his right to punish a rebel Sheikh (Khaled) originally
appointed by him. Mr. Philby’s ready acquiescence in Bin Sand’s assertion that
King’s action is aggressive is, from my point of view, most regrettable and ill-advised.
Hitherto Mecca has depended for protection on Ottoman (Egyptian or Turkish) military
support. We have now, temporarily at any rate, replaced Ottomans, and should
endeavour to maintain and strengthen influence of our foremost protege and staunchest
anti-Turkish unit in Arabia.
At the same time I fully appreciate necessity of returning friendship of Bin Saud,
whom I understand represents strongest, if not only, Anglophil element in Nejdean
politics. Wahabism, in less honest and capable hands than his, might be easily
converted from a potential into an active menace. I agree that Bin Saud should be
treated liberally in the matter of funds, which may also exercise a pacifying influence
on hostile public opinion, referred to by Mr. Philby ; but I would urge that other
sinews of war should not be supplied by us unless absolutely necessary, and then in
minimum quantities requisite, to retain his personal good-will and authority.
If His Majesty’s Government accept the views, I suggest written communication
to Bin Saud, referred to in paragraph 1 of Bagdad telegram No. 6491, should be in
following sense:—
That we hold firmly to our treaty of December 1915 with him, and desire to
prevent by every means open to us aggression against his [? territory], precise limits
of which as implied in article 1 cannot at present be known.