"سيستان" [و‎‎٣‎٨‎٨] (٧٨٢/٧٧٧)

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But-S T 1 hpHplp 7 •f 6 ?”i! 1 UP ° n thG st ^ te g lcal im P°rtance to India of Seistan.
it will ho J f G ^ 0W . g T ral . ly reco ^ ized here and in England,
Pii M t0 that a Russi 1 an railwa y through Eastern Persia to the
LT+on G ^ eans neit her more nor less than the final loss to Great Britain of
feeistan and that the recent declarations of the British Government as to our
interests in that quarter forbid me to believe that they would acquiesce in any
such calamity, lor my own part, if Persia were to hypothecate to Russia the
revenues of Seistan (a move which has recently been under contemplation,
but which I should regard as not less insulting to ourselves than would be to
Russia the hypothecation of the revenues of Meshed to Great Britain), or to
cede to Russia a commanding political position on that section of the border, I
should not hesitate to advise that the Persian Government be compelled to
cancel the arrangement. Such a peril can, however, be more opportunely
averted by a plain declaration of our views and intentions in advance, than by
threats or military movements afterwards.
15. Should a Russian naval port be constructed in the Gulf, and should
a Russian fleet (most likely in connection witli the French) be called into
existence in the Indian Ocean, it is impossible, either for the protection of our
trade, or for the safety of our own shores, that we could remain content with
the existing strength of the East India squadron. We should have to place
the ports on the eastern coasts of India in a state of more finished defence
than is at present the case. Our military and naval responsibilities would be
more than doubled in that direction.
16. The question would next arise how far Russia would find it compa
tible with her newly acquired political ascendency, that the main lines of
telegraphic communication between Great Britain and India should run through
Persian territory or beneath the waters of the Persian Gulf. Even if she were
ready to leave them intact, should we be prepared to acquiesce in the control,
at a time of emergency, of these lines by a foreign and probably a hostile
power ?
17. It has been argued that, if Russia cannot in prudence be allowed a
port at the south-eastern end of the Persian Gulf, owing to its close proximity
to Indian shores, and its patent challenge to Indian interests, we need entertain
no such scruples about a port nearer to the upper end. As I have previously
argued, a commercial port, as the terminus of a commercial railway, may be
rendered equally innocuous anywhere in the Gulf. But if it is to be a political
port, and the terminus of a political railway, then it is equally objectionable
wherever it be placed, and the mere geographical distance of a few hundred
miles, or one or two days steam, makes no difference in the situation. Political
control over Southern Persia can equally be disseminated from lines termi
nating at Mohammerah, Bushire, Bunder Abbas, or Chahbar. Whichever be
the naval base, the ships that lie there can equally menace Indian commerce,
Indian shipping, and Indian interests. Moreover, while at the near end of
the Gulf, a Russian railway to the sea would have the drawbacks already men
tioned of invading the British sphere of interest in Seistan and Persian Baluch
istan, of destroying British influence in those regions, and of directly menacing
the British-protected territories of the Khan of Kalat—a Russian railway to
the upper end, e.g., to Mohammerah on the Karun, would similarly traverse a
region (that inhabited by the Lur and Bakhtiari tribes) in which British
influence has hitherto remained uncontested, and where British enterprise has
established an adventurous and successful foothold, and would terminate in
a port which is owned by an Arab Sheikh whose family has been uniformly
friendly to the British power, and which commands the main channel of the
Shat-el-Arab or combined estuary of the Tigris and Euphrates. To concede such
a position to Russia would place the approach to Baghdad within her power,
and would extinguish the influence of Great Britain in Turkish Arabia.
18. The international aspect of the acquisition by Russia of a port at
either end of the Persian Gulf cannot be ignored. Such an incident could not
possibly stand alone. Under instructions from the Home Government, we