ملاحظات أُعدت كمرجع خلال جولة كرزون في الخليج الفارسي، وأوراق أخرى عن بلاد فارس والخليج الفارسي [و‎‎١‎٤‎٠] (٦٧٨/٢٧٩)

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of the Turks, seized the opportunity to interfere, and collected men to attack the
island, while the Turkish authorities wrote to our Political Agent at Bushahr to
say that they could no longer control him. It is evident that in acting thus the
Turks had everything to gain and nothing to lose. In any case they would find
out whether we really intended to protect Shekh Isa of Bahren ; if Jasim succeed
ed in capturing and holding the island, it would eventually come under Turkish
control; and if he was defeated his power, which is still considerable, would be
broken. The following collected by Jasim amounted to about 4,500 men, about
15 per cent, of whom were armed with rifles, and boats were collected for a simul
taneous attack on Bahren from four different points, including Zabara, Ajer and
Katif. At this time the position in the island was somewhat critical, the people
were panic-stricken, a muster of the defensive force produced an ill-armed and
useless rabble of about 1,500 men, and it was only Captain Felly’s prompt action
in finding and destroying the boats that prevented the attack from taking place.
Owing to Shekh Jasim’s refusal to pay the fine inflicted by the British Gov- Troops necessary for
ernment, and our subsequent action in allowing the owners of the boats, kept as P rotectio n in case
security, to redeem them themselves, it is probable that these men will ’not be so o£attack '
ready to join their chief in another attack on the island. Should it be necessary,
however, at any future period to send troops from India for the protection of
Bahren, one native regiment would probably be ample for the work. As stated
above the bulk of the population is collected at the northern end of the island
the water here is fairly deep, and a gun-boat or two could easily protect the large
towns from the sea side. The water which separates Bahren from the main-land
to the south and south-east has never been properly surveyed, but it is in many
places very shallow, and there is probably no channel by which a gun-boat could
get round. So much so is this the case to the south-east that at low water it is
said that a man can wade out for nearly 20 miles, and it is here if anywhere that
there might be difficulty in preventing a hostile force from landing. On the
other hand this part of the island is quite barren and sparsely populated, and
little damage could be done. On the whole the best place to post a regiment
would appear to be close outside the town of Manameh. Here there is 'an old
fort, about 100 yards square, with high walls, bastions at the corners and a
parapet round, in fairly good preservation, and the fort, which is quite empty inside,
has open sandy ground round it and good water close by. Many of the poorer
natives of the island live in huts, built of palm-branches, and such huts could be
easily and quickly constructed for troops to live in, either inside the fort or, which
would probably be better, on the sandy plain outside, using the fort itself for
stores with the power of retiring into it, if necessary. A detachment in the
neighbourhood of the large village of El Bidia might also be required. Troops
would have to draw their supplies entirely from India.