ملف ١٩١٦/٣٣٦٠ الجزء ٣ "مراسلات بلاد فارس. (١٩١٨-١٩٢٢)" [و‎‎٦‎٧] (٦٦٨/١٤٤)

It moist be expected that the situation in Persia will quickly deteriorate
unless either the Allies or His Majesty’s Government alone are in a position
to do something more than what is indicated in the above cited correspon-
^ dence, or unless in the alternative they intend in future to make terms with
Soviet Government.
Fresh agitation of the official and public mind here has been caused by
the decision, reported by Keuter, to evacuate Batoum. We have no informa
tion as to the ground of this report. The withdrawal of our troops from
Eastern Persia, (of which rumours have reached me), wmuld be regarded as
nothing short of betrayal if it is ordered before Persia is in a position to fill
the breach and before the present crisis is over. I would also respectfully
remind Your Lordship that the advantages of Agreement as an insurance
against Bolshevism were concisely specified both in your speech of Sep
tember 18th, which was widely read in Persia, and in your memo
randum to War Cabinet on August 9th. Personally, serious intention on
the part of the Bolshevik Cabinet of taking aggressive action acainst Persia
has not hitherto been believed in by me. They seemed to be merely trying
to intimidate us into making terms with them by means of intensive pro
paganda, but I am bound to say that this assumption cannot safely be made
any longer in view of reports coming in and recent developments. We must
remember that, if they do carry their aggression into Persia, it will be because
they regard Persia as one of the shortest routes to London (India ?) and not
from any hostility to Persian Government towards whom they have always
professed the most benevolent intentions.
Situation at present is that Persia has already been entered by many
small parties of Bolsheviks and by some well-known terrorists. Some have
been captured, others have got through and a large organisation is disclosed by
the papers which have been seized. In Tehran and towns near the Northern
Frontier pro-Bolshevik Committees, engineered by Bolshevik agents, are being
created and the opponents of this Cabinet among local party politicians are
prompt to seize on any alarmist report in order to make Government unpopular
and create unrest.
I have again been interviewed by the Prime Minister on the subject.
Organisation of military force is being hurried on by all possible means and
he has been warned by me regarding the immediate prospects in the Caucasus.
But the important factors for Persia are of course (1) the control of the Cas
pian, and (2) as indicated in my telegram 747 of November 21st, the holding of
the lines from Tabriz to Astara and Enzeli to Astrabad.
Both from the point of view of His Majesty’s Government and from that
of Persian Government, I respectfully urge that situation should be con
sidered again and that further examination be made into possibility (1) of
securing Control over the Caspian with smaller forces than those you indicate
in your telegram 67 and (2) of adopting plan which I outlined in my telegram
747, wilh support of Government troops and in conjunction with them.
58
‘Telegram R., No. 46-C., dated the 21st (received 24fth) February 1920.
From—His Britannic Majesty’s Consul-General, Meshed,
To—The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political
Department, Delhi.
(Repeated as usual, Tehran No. 48.)
Continuation of my telegram 41-0.
Herat news dated February 13th.