أوراق بقلم كرزون بشأن الشرق الأدنى والأوسط [ظ‎‎٦] (٣٤٨/١٢)

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the future controlling power of Constantinople themselves. Differing opinions may >e
held as to the degree of advantage or peril resulting from such an arrangement, out it
is one as to which l am profoundly convinced that it would not conduce eit ici o t ie
peace of the world or to ihe security of British interests m the Last. I «oou no
however, attach any particular value to the remaiks I made were it not that i found
them to be in accord, with the general opinions entertained by the Ambassador.
I commenced by saying that for my part 1 was a strong advocate of the comp etc
expulsion of the Turks as a ruling power from Europe; and the reason, apart from
many others, that seemed to me to be decisive was this : the power and prestige ot the
Sultan in all parts of the Mussulman world rested, in my judgment, in the main upon
two bases; first, his possession of the Holy Places, and, secondly, his position ar,
Constantinople. Of the former he had already been deprived ; but as long as he remained
at the historic capital of the Eastern world, with the halo of almost hieratic prestige that
surrounds it, so long the majority of his religious adherents tbrougliout the woild
would not only regard him as Calif, but as unconquered, so long would he continue to
be a disturbing force in the international situation in the future. Whethe the future
administration of Constantinople was international or was consigned to an individual
Power, so long as the Turkish Government remained there, Stambul would be the
centre and pivot to which all Mussulmans would turn, and the Turks would revel in
the fresh opportunity presented to them of playing upon the rivalries and jealousies ot
Europe. Once he was expelled from Constantinople, he would become the Sovereign
of an Asiatic State, much on the same footing as the Shah of Persia or the Ameer of
Afghanistan, and the Turks would sink to a second or third place, if not lower, among
the nations of the world. All the more would the Mahommedan world regard his
remaining in Constantinople as a sign of victory, and his expulsion as the crowning
evidence of defeat, because it was well known that his eviction from Europe had been
one of the stated objects of the Allies since the commencement of the war, and that
in the event of Allied victory Constantinople had actually at an early stage been
promised by Great Britain and France to Pvussia.
Personally, I regarded this promise to Russia as one of the great mistakes of the
war, fortunatelv nullified by the progress of events. I could not understand how the
British and French Governments had ever agreed to sm-h a concession—a point in
which the Ambassador expressed his cordial agreement—and I added that, had 1 been
a Russian myself, I should have regarded it as fatal to my own country to be drawn
dowri the Bosphorus, and involved in all the dangers and intrigues of the Mediterranean
and the Levant. t- to
Similar considerations, in my view, applied to the other great European Powers,
who, I thought, would act extremely unwisely in their own as well as in the public
interest, were they attracted by such a lure. Were the invitation addressed to my
own country, did the Powers of Europe, at Paris or elsewhere, come to me with the
mandate for Constantinople in their hands, urging that, as Britain^ was the
greatest Oriental Power in the world, and as all the countries betwet n Europe and
India fell more or less within the focus of our influence the gate of the East should
therefore, naturally, be entrusted to our hands, I would yet, if the decision rested
with me, decline to be tempted by such an offer and would unhesitatingly refuse it.
I did not know what was the view entertained in France. I was aware that
the French had considerable interests, financial and otherwise, in Constantinople, and
their recent attitude seemed to show that these interests were being pushed with great
activity. Whether France aspired to receive the mandate I had no knowledge ; but if
I were in her position I should resist the temptation and decline the spoil. Indeed, 1
went on to say that, as a warm friend of France. I was greatly surprised, and indeed
somewhat alarmed, that at a moment, when although she had reached the zenith of her
glory and earned the ungrudging admiration of the world, she was yet faced with such
prospective dangers on her own frontier that she was about to invite the assent ot
Europe to the most momentous changes, in order to guarantee her security in the future,
and when every man and every resource that she possessed might one day be called upon
for the defence of her own central hearth, she should yet, in addition to the vast
responsibility which she already possesses in so many parts of the world, be apparently
anxious to extend the sphere of her influence so as to embrace Tangier on the one side,
Syria, and possibly Cilicia, on the other; it might be Constantinople as well. It
was for France to decide her own policy, and Great Britain could not fail to regard
all that concerned her with a most sympathetic eye. But I was surprised at the
eagerness with which European Powersj already burdened, were stretching their hands
out for fresh loads which would certainly be troublesome, and might even be crushing in