ملف ٦٤٩٩/ ١٩٢٠ الجزء ١ "شؤون الكويت: النزاع الحدودي بين الكويت ونجد؛ عدم شعبية الشيخ محلّيًا" [ظ‎‎٤‎٠] (٢٩٤/٧٤)

readiness for action, their independence (within their flight
of communications, their indifference to obstacles, and theinab|
of the enemy to counter their attack combine to encourage their u
offensively more often than the occasion warrants Theli^
tions of military forces, the numbers of troops involved, andft
preparation necessary for a successful expedition are all
which must have a steadying effect on a local political or miHta,
commander burning under a sense of indignity suffered by
of the action of an unruly group. The danger to be guarded aga>
is thus that the power to go to war at will should result in a the ;
less application of that power.
7 The considerations of para. 6 are applicable to all groups
formations of aircraft of whatever size but the danger of abuse
greater in the case of small detachments, and the consequence,
Buch misuse more serious. Under normal conditions the fact 4
a small detachment only of the Royal Air Force is employed pi
sunnoses that the troops on the spot are also inconsiderable;
number and the place of relatively minor importance. Thusti
military commander and the political officer may both be oi
comparatively junior rank and less likely to be of expert
iudgment Aircraft alone confer on these junior officers the A 1
to go to war at a moment’s notice, and the temptation to
to their use on every minor occasion may be irresistible : the _
ouences of this are serious. The British policy of keeping pea«
the troubled places of the Empire is invariably to rely as far
possible on the prestige of the white man. This prestige is nornul
obtained by the presence of white officials; it must indeed;
backed by'force, but this force is only resorted to when «
suasion has failed. Thus every little incident is not followedi
immediately by a minor operation, but protracted disobedient
punished by a carefully prepared expedition, which, by a consit
able display of force and the infliction of condign puniskfi
re-establishes, at any rate for a time, our moral superiority. a -’
methods should be but are not invariably followed when
forces are available. Thus it was proposed to use the smalli
detachment in S.E. Persia for the harassing of disobedient cbie
and the retention of this same flight at Bushire has been asked:
to be at the disposal of the local political officer for similar purp
Speed in inflicting punishment may, it is recognised, at times si
minor trouble from developing into a serious situation, but
too often speed is the result of lack of thought and may haver
consequences.
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these small air detachments are unsatisfactory, but because of tl-
inefficiency for the purpose of enforcing respect. Aircraft depesis
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