ملف ٧٢٥١/١٩٢٠ الجزء ٣ "الجزيرة العربية: الوضع والسياسة؛ جدول أعمال اجتماعات اللجنة المشتركة بين الإدارات" [ظ‎‎٢‎٠‎٣] (٢٦٨/٤٣)

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been generally recognised by other Powers that th. ir interference in the territories of
these rulers would Oe regarded as an unfriendly act, , . .
Out of the remaining four rulers in the list in paragraph 3 the territories of two,
namely the Imam and the Idrisi, are coterminous with the Aden pi electorate, while
the territories of the other two, namely, Ibn Rashid and the Anazeh, are coterminous
with the British mandatory areas of Mesopotamia and Irans-Jordan. 1 ie only other^
Power which con legitimately claim an interest m any of the ten areas defined m
paragraph 3 is France, since portions of the Anazeh he within the French mandatory
areaf 5 It is for this reason that it has been decided to m;ike no attempt to deal with
the' Anazeh ;<s one confederation under one r. ler, but to regard the eastern section of
the tribe as dependent upon Mesopotamia. . . A , . . ,, „ ^
Anoth r argument for the recognition of British interests in Arabia is the fact that
His Majesty’s Government are already in treaty relations with all of the ten areas
except the An izeh, Ibn Rashid and the Imam.
It is perhaps, as well, in order to remove any misapprehensions as to the object of
the Arabian Treaty, which is now being negotiated, to point out that we are
endeavouring to obtain no new position in Arabia—at any rate, in so far as eight out
of the ten a?eas are concerned. His Majesty’s Government are already regarded by all
the rulers with the possible exceptions of the Imam and Ibn hashid, as the only foreign
Power which has any real interest in the peninsira. Other Powers are well aware of
this and it is only the separation of Arabia from the Ottoman Empire winch renders it
desirable to obtain official concurrence from the other Allies to a state of affairs winch m
effect already exists. The object of the present discussion is merely to arrne at a
CO ordinated policy, which will in future be f llovved by His Majesty s Government, and
to decide whether those areas and rulers with whom His Majesty s Government were
noi intimately connected before the war should now be placed on the same footing
as those with whom they have h d dealings for many years past, or whether it is
necessary to revise the policy of fin ncial support and to withdraw it from those rulers
who have been receiving it f«»r so long
The urgent - ecesdty of having some instrument on paper defining the pos tion ot
His Majesty’s Gove nment in Arabia may he seen from enquiries directed by the German
and American Governments as to the position of Bahrein .
6. Although the Hcdjaz and Aden are excluded from the peninsula as defined in
the draft treaty, neither area can be overlooked in any discussion of the policy ot His
Majesty’s Government in Arabia.
The independent Kingdom of the Hedjaz contains the Holy Places of Mecca
and Medina, which are venerated by Moslems throughout the world, and which are of
international importance owing to the yearh pilgrimage. As the Allied Power with
the greatest Mahommedan interests, and as the originator of the movement which
resulted in the independence of the Hedjaz and the kingship of King Hussein, His
Majesty’s Government could not readily admit that any other Power is so intimately
connected with the future of that country as herself. In view of its status as an
independent member of the League of Nations, it is impossible to include it in the area
in which His Majestv’s Government are demanding a special position, but the fact that
u will be entirely surrounded by areas for which His Majesty’s Government, are
11,1 1 IJ 1 "YT., 1 ’r, /-.w, tv,,q c m qI tnr T'AP.T, in a
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responsible, or in which His Majesty’s Go\ ernment are, as a matter of fact, in a
predominant position already, must inevitably lead to the Hedj iz Government
regarding His Majesty’s Government as more important to themselves than any other
P »wer. The areas borderiog on the Hedjaz are the British mandatory areas of Palestine
and Trans-Jordan, and the territories of Ibu B-ashid, Ihn Saud and the Idrisi, two ot
whom have agreed to accept the arbitration of His Majesty’s Government on frontier
questions. King Hussein himself has also agreed to arcept this arbitration. Ide
final definition of the frontiers of the Hedjaz could most suitably be embodied in
a treaty between King Hussein, on the one side, and His Majesty’s Government,
as representing his immediate neighbours, on the other. Other Powers might
certainly object to tins, but, even if they hesitate to confirm in writing the
existing Bririsii position in Arabia, nothing c^n alter the fact ihat it is to His
Majesty’s Government alone that all concerned look for a just and satisfactory
settlement, and, in whatever manner the boundaries may be fixed, British arbitra
tion alone will be appealed to in frontier disputes. Apart from the question of
boundaries, which may have to be fixed by a commission appointed by ihe League of
Nations, there appears to he no insuperable objection to Hi^> Majesty’s Government
concluding a treaty with the independent Kingdom of the Heihaz, as eventually
defined, which may or may not include some provision for financial support, provided