File 600/1905 Pt 2 'Aden Hinterland: Future Policy' [‎260r] (7/226)

lliis cardinal principle, then, we hold in common.
The suggested applications of that principle, how
ever, disclose a view of its practical meaning, which I
am unable to share. For example, Your Excel
lency discusses the use of a subsidy in enabling the
Amir of D thaia to hold his own either against the
tribes or the Turks ; and the point is emphasised
that “ such success as has hitherto attended the
“ policy of consolidating the waning authority of
the Amir of E’thala, lias been mainly due to the
“ moral and material support which is afforded to
“ hi m by the presence of our political agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. and
“ the British force at that place.” Or, as the Aden
Resident puts it, the moral support of our troops
“ in time overcome the reluctance (of the
tribesmen) to accept the Amir’s suzerainty.”
Surely here is an unexpected version of the
policy of non-interference with the domestic
affairs of the tribes, and studious non-entangle
ment in purely tribal affairs (paragraph 8).
It seems to reduce cordial adhesion to the
much, less hopeful level of pious opinion.
This rather perplexing interpretation of the policy
of non-interference and freedom from entangle
ment undergoes in later paragraphs a still more
formidable extension. “ If Turkish intrigue and
“ Mahometan fanaticism are to be left uncontrolled
“in that country [the Aden Hinterland] so
the Government of India assure me—“ we fear
“ that we shall before long be involved in opera-
“ tions that might have been avoided by a firm
“and consistent attitude towards the tribes”
(paragraph 13). But what is this attitude to be ?
Interference or non-interference ? We are to take
in hand from Aden the control of Turkish intrigue
and Mahometan fanaticism. “ It [our withdrawal],”
says the Resident at Aden, “ would afford them
“ [the Turks] unlimited opportunities for . . .
“ the furtherance of the Pan-Islamic programme.”
Can we hope to exercise this control over such
subtle and pervasive forces as fanaticism and
intrigue without meddling in any of the internal
and domestic doings of the tribes ? We are urged
to look even further than this. “ There is a real
danger,” Your Excellency warns us, “ that, if we
“ now withdraw, in a few years we may be
“ confronted with an independent Arabia.” These
apprehensions, if I understand them aright, point
to an indefinite period of such observation and
control as would either be meaningless and in
effectual, or else would inevitably draw us into
that active, perpetual, and costly interference, to
the mischiefs of which we all with entire sincerity
profess ourselves alive.
4. Here I find myself compelled to draw atten
tion to the Indian aspect of this discussion—that
being the only aspect with which the Government
of India is immediately concerned. We are, it
would seem, to extend the military and financial
liabilities of India, not merely to help or defend