File 600/1905 Pt 2 'Aden Hinterland: Future Policy' [‎260v] (8/226)

the fortress at Aden, but “ to stem a re igious tide
in Yemen,” though, by the way the stemming of
religious tides is a delicate operation, ami has neve
hitherto been regarded as a desuab.e or even
tolerable element in Indian policy, ^t, I would
ask whether this is a case m which ye^iould be
guided by precedents from the North-West a
other frontiers of the Indian Empire. The Aden
Hinterland is not a frontier province in any natmal
sense. Aden is an outlying post admmistratively
connected with Bombay, and wholly different in its
character fromthe boundaries that have been reac le
upon our vast border line to-c'ay after twenty years
of conflict both in counsel and in arms. II
position of Aden, in short, in the ordering ot Indian
territories and policy is peculiar, and arguments
overlooking this circumstance may easily tail
nf nnv true mark of Indian statesmanship.
5. Whether the rise of an independent Arabia
he a near or a remote contingency, there can at
least h* no doubt that the advent of such a
question upon the international horizon, whatever
part a British Government might choose to take
in respect of it, would assuredly be a subject ol
Imperial policy, not to he decided by considerations
of Indian interest alone or even primarily. Bora
Salisbury, as Secretary of State for India, pointed
out in the year 1874, the marked change that
has’been effected in the military, political, and
commercial value to Great Britain of our position
at Aden, since it came into our possession as a
decayed settlement of comparatively small impor
tance nearly seventy years ago. The Suez Canal
wholly transformed its place in any system ol
Indian interests, making it the key to the great
commercial highway to the East, used by great
fleets of merchant ships of all the nations ot
the world. We are thus involve:!, said Lord
Salisbury, “ in diplomatic action in which India
“ l ias no direct voice and over which she has no
“ practical control.” The occupation of Aden, m
short, derives its principal importance “ from its
“ relation to the general foreign policy of the
“ Empire, in which it holds a position analogous
“ to that of Malta and Gibraltar.” This propo
sition is beyond dispute. In view of it any
enlargement of Indian obligations in regard to
Aden is wholly unjustifiable, and all operations
tending in any degree towards such an enlargement
are to be sedulously and vigilantly avoided. 6 * *
6. Erom these larger considerations of general
policy, I pass to what may be regarded ^ as the
secondary arguments in your Excellency’s Des
patch. It is stated that Aden is unhealthy, and
that troops cannot l)e tiained at Aden. Neither the
Aden Administration reports nor the Army
Medical reports accessible to me tend to prove
that the climate has become of late more injurious
either to Native or European troops. Compared
even with the returns for Poona, Aden seems