File 600/1905 Pt 2 'Aden Hinterland: Future Policy' [‎272v] (32/226)

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best method of dealing with the Chiefs and the tribes, in order to carry out
this policy with due regard to Treaty obligations, and with the least risk of
disturbance.
Now, short of annexation, or administration in some form without
annexation, which no one desires, there are two methods of dealing with
frontier tribes in a position similar to that of the Aden tribes. There is the
policy of absolute or almost absolute non-interference. That is the policy
which was pursued for nearly 60 years on the Punjab frontier, with the
result, as once described by Lord Lytton in a famous Despatch, that we
were forced into constant punitive expeditions, and that no British officer 8
life was safe a mile beyond our own frontier. The other is the policy of
friendly intercourse and co-operation with the Chiefs and Headmen, of
givingthem support by the grant of small subsidies, of interfering not at
all in the internal management of the tribe, while endeavouring to prevent
intertribal fighting by tendering cur good offices in the settlement of inter
tribal quarrels. That is the policy which in Baluchistan, while preserving
the autonomy of the tribes, has replaced chaos by peace, order, and
prosperity. There has been a battle royal between these two policies on the
Indian frontier for the past thirty years. The latter has won the day, and
has been successfully applied on the northern frontier, in Hunza, Nagar,
Dir. Swat, and Chitral, while it was the hope of its successful application,
so far as possible, on the Punjab frontier, that led to the formation of the
Punjab frontier Province. I speak with knowledge, for after fighting the
battle of the policies on the frontier I was able to w r ateh its progress from
the Foreign Department under three successive Viceroys. It is the latter
policy which the Government of India are adopting in the Aden Hinterland.
To my mind there is no question of its superiority to the other policy
provided it is properly supervised. We have object lessons in the results of
both all along the Indian frontier. Twenty years of the one means no
progress, but rather retrogression, for meanwhile the tribes become better
armed and more unruly. Twenty years of the other means the growth of a
new and more settled generation disinclined to fight, and accustomed to
peaceful pursuits. The Aden Hinterland is especially well suited for the
application of the latter policy, for, as in Baluchistan, the people have an
aristocratic form of government and obey their Chiefs. The area,
too, of the country is small, while the population is sparse and very
easily controlled. In fact, compared with the difficulties we have suc
cessfully accomplished elsewhere, the problem at Aden seems to be a
simple one. We have a fairly quiet people to deal with, and have
Treaty relations with their Chiefs, who are in our pay. Our objects are to
encourage good government, to keep open the trade routes, to discourage
intertribal quarrels, to control the arms trade by pressure on the Chiefs, to
prevent raids across the frontier, and to keep in friendly relations with the
local Turkish officials across the border. For the rest, the tribes should be
left to govern themselves. While, therefore, reiterating the importance
of interfering as little as possible, I w r ould allow the Government of India to
continue their present policy and, at any rate for the present, to keep their
Political Officer and the troops at D’thala. Otherwise, as experience else
where teaches us is probable, we may bring about the very position we
desire to avoid, and be forced into punitive expeditions to put down tribal
disorder. The expeditions no doubt would not be serious ones, for the
Aden tribes are not formidable. There is no comparison between Afghanistan