File 600/1905 Pt 2 'Aden Hinterland: Future Policy' [‎273r] (33/226)

and D thala, and very little analogy, it seems to me, between Somaliland
and the comparatively settled country round Aden. But expeditious are to
be avoided, if possible, and I think we are far more likely to avoid them by
HintTnd. 0Ur PreSent POli ° y than ^ Wifchdra ™g altogether from the
As to the proposed railway to Nobat Dakin, I would treat the Abdali
Sultan with perfect frankness. We don’t want the line; but if he wants it
and is prepared to pay for it I would not throw obstacles in the way The
Sultan probably knows little about the cost of constructing railways and of
their upkeep. I would offer him the best advice we can give him. If our
experts, after examination, consider it would not pay, we should place th e
figures before the Sultan and strongly discourage its construction. He is
likely readily to acquiesce if he is convinced he will loose hy it. If, on the
other hand, it will pay, and the Sultan can find the money, I would let him
make it, and allow it to run into Aden.
This is a very hurried note, and I intended to rewrite and amplify it.
But as I understand Mr. Morley wishes to see it at once I send it on as
it is.
Since it was written I have seen Sir W. Lee-Warner’s draft Despatch.
I am afraid I cannot concur in it. I demur altogether to his view that
affairs in the Aden Hinterland were quieter before the demarcation than
they are now. It is only necessary to read the account of Aden in
Aitchisons Treaties to see that in the past we have constantly interfered to
settle tribal disputes, and often hy force. If the orders which it is now
proposed to give were strictly carried out, the local authorities would never
he able to interfere at all. But that is an attitude which, in practice, I
believe it will be quite impossible to maintain. Constant exceptions will he
forced upon us, and in the end the sum of our interferences will he at least
as great under the new as under the existing system, while our relations
with the tribes will be hostile instead of friendly. My main point is that
we ought not to forbid, as I understand the Despatch of 4th May did
forbid,® even the limited amount of interference and control which expe
rience shows us we have usefully exercised in the past. If it is now clearly
stated that this is not intended, much of my objection to the Despatch
disappears. I have no wish to see a railway made to D thala. If
Turkish intrigue, encroachment, or interference on our side of the border
did not exist, or could otherwise be effectually prevented, I should not be
sorry to see the Political Officer withdrawn from D thala. But in the
interests of the trade of Aden, and the supplies of Aden, for our own
good name and because of our Treaty obligations,there are, it seems to me,
two things we cannot allow within our sphere* viz., anarchy, that is, serious
intertribal disorder, and foreign interference. To prevent the first, some
measure of interference—at least as much as we have exercised in the past
is essential; to prevent the second, it looks as if for a time at any rate it was
necessary to keep an officer at D’thala. If we judge by the past, the Turks
are sure to intrigue if they can, and it seems to me that the irritation
between us and the Turkish Government is likely to be much less if border
matters are quietlv settled on the spot without reference to them than if
with imperfect information we are constantly making ineffectual protests at
Constantinople. Without therefore agreeing in all the arguments of the
Government of India, some of which, such as their reference to a possible