'HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR BASED ON OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS. THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA 1914-1918. VOLUME I.' [‎136v] (277/454)

248 HISTORY OF THE WAR : MESOPOTAMIA
So impressed was he by these considerations and by the idea
that the attack might fail and result in serious consequences
that he decided to put this point of view to General Nixon
in the possibility that the situation might allow of a post
ponement of the attack till it could be carried out over dry
ground. General Nixon, however, decided that the attack was
to take place as proposed. As will be seen, his decision was
justified fully by subsequent events.
General Townshend maintained his headquarters at Basra
while superintending the preparations for the attack, though
he made frequent visits to Qurna. This action on his part,
as well as the decision not to concentrate the attacking force
at Qurna till the last few days, was intended to leave the Turks
in doubt as to whether the coming attack was to be made up
the Tigris or the Euphrates. A further reason was that until
the latter part of May the operations in Arabistan still called
for the use of most of the river steamers on the Karun.
On the 19th May, the enemy displayed considerable activity
on the sandhills northward of Qurna ; they were evidently
placing guns in positions there and during the next week there
was a great increase in the sniping by night. Reports were
also received that the Turks had placed a gun in position west
of the A1 Huwair creek to cover the approaches to their right
flank. It was evident they were anticipating an attack.
On the 21st, General Dobbie, commanding the 17th Brigade,
was invalided and Colonel Climo, 24th Punjabis, was appointed
temporarily to take his place. At this period General Towns
hend was rather anxious to have some additional troops placed
at his disposal for the coming attack; and, although General
Nixon had some idea of sending him the 30th Infantry Brigade
just back from Ahwaz, he finally decided not to do so. Bv
the 26th, the greater part of the bellums, stores, etc., for the
advance had reached Qurna, and General Townshend with his
Divisional Headquarters, the 30th Mountain Battery and the
117th Mahrattas had also arrived at Qurna. The 117th were
to garrison Qurna when the advance commenced. He had
informed General Nixon a day or two before that he did not
think his preparations would allow of an advance before the 1st
June, but on it being pointed out to him that General Gorringe’s
demonstration towards Amara would have lost its effect by
then, General Townshend said on the 26th that he would
attack on the 31st. This was approved.
A memorandum was issued by General Townshend on the
26th, which gave detailed instructions for units which were