Coll 28/112A ‘Persia. Tabriz – Monthly despatches of internal situation in Azerbaijan & misc. reports.’ [‎590v] (1183/1237)

10. It was ostensibly these and similar set-backs that made General Cupal
abandon his post and leave for Tehran. The truth appears to be, however, that
he got himself into an impossible position by his bullying and insulting methods
at the beginning of his tenure, going so far as to abuse Kurds in public and knock
off their turbans. He seems also to have been unnecessarily stiff and tactless with
the Russians, who probably made things no easier for him, until he was forcecL
out of the place. During the last week or two he was obviously afraid of hi*
life, having received threatening letters and messages, and was never without
a strong guard, even taking two cars-full of police when he visited the telegraph
^ office, only a hundred yards or so from his official quarters. If Tehran is to retain
control of Rezaieh and its frontier area, it must send better men, not necessarily
military officers, but proved administrators with both courage and discretion, to
handle the various tribes and races, as well as to rub along with the Soviet
authorities on the spot.
11. I called on the Soviet Commandant on the first afternoon of my visit,
and found him with a young civilian who turned out to be the new Soviet Vice-
Consul at Rezaieh, not yet officially appointed to the post. The commandant is a
cavalry colonel, probably a very good soldier, but I should say not a particularly
clever administrator. The young vice-consul, who acted as interpreter, made most
of the running at the interview, although he cannot have been long in the place.
We did a lot more preliminary fencing than is usual even for a Russian interview,
until they at last asked my views on the local Rezaieh situation. I told the
commandant that I realised that the Persian Administration left a lot to be
desired, but that the flight of 1,000 inhabitants to Tabriz was a somewhat
doubtful advertisement for the Anglo-Soviet position in the country, and that
while my post was at Tabriz on one of the main lines of communication between
the U.S.S.R. and British supplies, I could not but be deeply interested in the state
of the country flanking this line, and so on. I mentioned the murders and
robberies which were undoubtedly taking place, and touched on the existence of
subversive committees in the town and district. The commandant and vice-
consul replied in the now usual way about provocative acts and Fascist instigation,
and even accused some of those who had fled Rezaieh without their families, of
having done so expressly to injure the Soviet! I merely mentioned the unsatis
factory An East India Company trading post. position of the local administration, its lack of sufficient competent forces
to keep law and order, its timidity and confusion which complete Soviet aloofness
would do nothing to cure, and suggested that a certain amount of moral support
was called for, although I well knew that the Russian authorities insisted on not
* interfering in the internal affairs of the country. Our interview was very polite
* and friendly throughout, and yet I felt that the commandant was somewhat
I nervous about my visit, which had undoubtedly been notified to him some days
beforehand. On the following day I heard that he sent for the Farmandar and
questioned him repeatedly about his conversation with me; at the end he said
that it had been decided that the local authorities might have seventy-two police
after all.
12. What I did not mention to the Russian Commandant, partly because I
am becoming diffident of harping oq the same theme, and partly because I feel
that no protests by me in Tabriz will remedy matters, was the evidence I found at
Rezaieh, just as I have been finding at Tabriz, of the activities of the political
officers, Politruk, N.K.V.D., or whatever the organisation may be called. While
it must be said that the Persians, particularly the official and propertied classes,
are only too ready to scent signs of Bolshevik and Communist activity among the
r masses, my enquiries convince me that there is too much done in this regard by
certain Soviet authorities, either from misplaced ideological zeal or because they
cannot see anything amiss in doing so in another country, especially when they
find conditions lending themselves so well for the purpose. There is no Persian
medical organisation whatever in the country districts, and Soviet medical officers
visit the villages with professional skill—and talk about how much better off and
more cared for the peasants are in the U.S.S.R. Other officers in uniform visit
the schools and give glowing descriptions of Soviet institutions, besides telling
the pupils to insist on being taught in Azerbaijan Turkish instead of useless
Persian. Such activities have an upsetting effect on the Persian teachers as much
as or more than on the pupils. The masters (as I heard from one of them who
spoke good English and I think did not exaggerate) do not know where they
stand, or whether it is of any use continuing with a proper programme.
Discipline is bad, both between headmasters and assistants, and between teachers