‘Persia – especially Seistan’ [‎167r] (332/949)

3
secure than (i). There is nothing to prevent it being taken in hand at once.
But I am inclined to think that, on purely strategical grounds, (3) would be
preferable to either of the above. We must remember that Russia can bring
enormous numbers into the field and that it is quite possible that their sheer
weight would drive us out of Seistan eventually, especially if we were straining
every nerve to ward off her attacks elsewhere. If we were driven out of Seistan
we should have to retreat along our railway line to India. Now it is a fact
that the nasty destruction of a railway line during the course of a more or less
hurried retreat is a practically impossible operation. At least only slight and
nporai y damage is inflicted. Ii we decide to adopt either routes (1) or (2) there
v/ouid always be a danger that, in case of defeat in Seistan, we should practi
cally be presenting our enemies with an excellent line of advance which, with
a little arrangement and some comparatively slight repairs, would conduct
them direct to Nushki, what time another Russian force was engaging the
remainder of our troops in the southern theatre at Kandahar or on the Khojak.
In fact, as Colonel Rittich very rightly observes, anything in the nature of a
direct Nushki-Seistan line v/ould have the defect of playing into the hands of
f; JSS:a :\ c Itis here » 1 that, on purely strategical lines, the advantage of a
Karachi-Seistan railway becomes apparent. For, even if we were beaten, a
contingency which it is always necesary for us to take into consideration,
Russia, if she wished to take advantage cf the railway, would be compelled
to advance along a far lengthier and more difficult line, through a country
far better adapted to a senes of defensive actions, and, if she succeeded in win-
nmg hei way in the face of all these obstacles, she would arrive eventually
in fnciia at Karachi, with exhausted and attenuated troops, at a point where we
could previously have concentrated, by sea and land, a force amply sufficient
in all probability, to crush her.
8. Bearing the foregoing considerations in mind, it appears to me that
to insure a reasonable degree of safety against Russian schemes of aggression
in and from the side of Persia it is desirable that we should undertake the
construction: —
(1) Of a Bunder Abbas-Seistan line as marked in green on the map.
(2) Of a further connection from Seistan to Karachi, preferably, say,
by Mr. John’s route as marked on the map in parellel red and
green liner.
9. How would such railways pan out if submitted to the crucial test of a
Russian at tck ? Such an attack would almost certainly be of a twofold charac
ter, (;?) by a force operating along Col. Rittich s line, which we may assume
has been constructed as far as Kerman; (6) by a force advancing by a line
through Khorasan on Seistan, or through Herat and Farah on the same
place. No v in (a) the Russian line of communications from their frontier
to Kerman would be some 1,057 miles, and there would be a further distance
of about 150 miles from Kerman to Bam or Regan, the nearest point on our
railway. Given sufficient troops we should be enabled to reinforce our posi
tion on this line far more rapidly than the Russians could bring up troops on
theirs, for from Bunder Abbas to Regan would be only 277 miles, and Bunder
Abbas itself is only 757 miles, or 70 hours steaming from Karachi. More
over it would also be possible to bring reinforcements to this line by land from
Karachi by means of the railway postulated above. Probably, therefore,
we should be atle seriously to retard the Russian advance. Suppose, however’,
that we were defeated by the superior numbers of the enemy and that their
forces advanced to Regan. What would Russia’s next move be? It would
be of little use her advancing to the se? r where we were predominant, opposed
all the way by our troops. To turn northwards towards Seistan, on thi other
hand, would compel her to expose her flank and rear to our forces based on
the see, and she could only move in safety on Seistan after first detaching a
large force to guard her communications. These, again, would be liable to
attack from cur troops operating from the Karachi-Seistan railway. In fact,
the oisadvantages to Russia resulting from our making the lines proposed
would, I think, be such as to deter her frcm carrying cut Cel. Rittich s
scheme.