‘Persia – especially Seistan’ [‎167v] (333/949)

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io. Let us now suppose that Russia abandons all idea of an advance
in strength against us through South East Persia and contents herself, apart
from operations elsewhere, with advancing on Seistan through either Askha-
bad-Meshed, or through Herat-Farah, cr through both. We should then
be able to reinforce our troops in Seistan both from the entrance to the Gulf
and from Karachi. Moreover, if Russia advanced on Seistan by the Farah
line she would be exposing her hank to our troops from Quetta, who would
certainly be at, or in advance of, Girishk. Again, if under these circumstances
we were defeated and driven out of Seistan, and Russia followed us up along
the two lines of railway, they would land her eventually at places most dis
advantageous to herself, where we were predominant, and, presumably, al
most unassailable on the sea. Even if Russia recognised the futility of coming
in strength down these lines, and concentrated her efforts on her soundest
course, a direct advance through and beyond Kandahar, the existence of the
two railways we are considering would compel her to lock up a very large
force in the neighbourhood of Seistan, and would reduce to the same extent
the number of troops she would be able to bring into the really vital part
of the field against us.
n. It is hardly necessary to pursue these theoretical considerations
further. I have attempted to show what should be our answer to the
schemes of Col. Rittich, schemes conceived on a gigantic scale and which
must necessarily cost almost untold millions. We are instructed that it is
useless putting forward academic proposals which may never get beyond the
pigeon holes of Simla. But I venture to submit that any answer to the gig
antic ideas of Col. Rittich must of necessity itself be framed on a some-
what large scale. I know of no simple and inexpensive specific which will
enable us by a stroke of the pen, or by the construction of a chov/kidar’s
hut, to bar the way to Russia. Our answer, if we seriously intend to safe
guard our interests and our Empire in Asia, must be a large and expensive
one, but neither so large nor so expensive as the design which Russia, appa
rently, is ready and willing to spend millions on, with a view to recouping
herself at our expense later on, when, through our unwillingness to
act or to spend money on our defences, she shall have ousted us from
our present position. If, therefore, Cel. Rittich s plan is likely fsericusly
to be taken up by Russia, it is necessary that the means to defeat it
should be seriously taken in hand by us, and we must make up
our minds at once that such counter-plans will cost money. But the
cost may be lessened if our action is prompt. I think that a proof
of cur determination to construct immediately a Bunder Abbas-Seistan
line would cause Col. Rittich’s scheme to fall to the ground. The check
mate would be so obvious and so overwhelming that the idea would not be
persisted in. But if we delay, and thus allow Russia definitely to commit
herself to the proposed line, we will almost cert, inly incur in the end en
ormously greater expense than would have to be faced in the event of prompt
action new.
W. Malleson,—13-4-04.
Your Excellency—
His Excellency, the Viceroy, has asked the military authorities to ad-
v : '»e what practical counter-measures would be necessary to anticipate and
defeat this latest Russian scheme for a through railway line from north
western Persia to the sea.
The question resolves itself into one of strategy; for if v/e take up posi
tions which we might have to abandon in the face of superior force, or if we
create fresh responsibilities which we cannot defend, we shall render our
selves liable to heavy loss cf prestige in the initial stages of a conflict. The
first necessary step, therefore, seems to be to examine how this Russian
scheme threatens our position in India and to devise means to ensure that
we shall hold what we have got, before we launch out into subsidiary pro-
gremm^s. Having secured that object, future developments, in accordance