‘Persia – especially Seistan’ [‎268r] (534/949)

Dated Bushire, the 2 nd October 1903.
From— Lieutenant-Colonel C. A. Kemball, C.I E., Political Resident A senior ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul General) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Residency. in the
. Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. ,
To—L. W. Dane, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Depart
ment.
I returned here on the 29 th September and sent you yesterday a telegram
about the Viceroy^ tour so far as regards the Durbar A public or private audience held by a high-ranking British colonial representative (e.g. Viceroy, Governor-General, or member of the British royal family). on the Arab Coast and
the distribution of presents. I now write in amplification of this telegram.
Prom Maskat to Mussendim is roughly 200 miles and on to Shargah is
80 miles. The Hardivge's departure from Maskat must therefore be timed
so as to reach Mussendim by daylight on the 21 st. There will be no difficulty
about this, I think. The Hardinge is a fast ship and should bo able to
reach Shargah by 3 p.h. on the 21st. I would like to arrive at Shargah before
the Viceroy so as to see that all is ready for the Durbar A public or private audience held by a high-ranking British colonial representative (e.g. Viceroy, Governor-General, or member of the British royal family). which might be held
at 4 p. m. on the 21st. The Lawrence is slow and I shall therefore have to
leave Maskat in advance of His Excellency and proceed straight te Shargah.
I think perhaps it will not be necessary forme to accompany His Excellency
to the Elphinstone Inlet, as, if I do so, I cannot arrive in advance at Shargah.
I hope my suggestion to have an extra ship placed at my disposal for the
purpose of collecting the various Trucial Chiefs and having them ready at
Shargah will be feasible.
Abu Dhabi is over 80 miles from Shargah and Um-el-Kowein is also
some little distance, and as the days are short in November, I am sure the most
satisfactory plan will be to have all the Chiefs ready on board a ship near the
spot where the Hardinge will anchor. I know by experience how difficult
it is to communicate between the shore and ships on this unprotected Coast, and
if the Chiefs have to put off from the shore as soon as the LLardinge is
sighted, it is quite possible that delay and inconvenience will be occasioned. I
am of course very anxious that no hitch should occur, and an extra ship at my
disposal will facilitate my arrangement and make us independent of adverse
winds and bad weather. If it cannot be arranged, I shall have to act on my
former suggestion and send the Lawrence round from Maskat on the 18 th
to collect the Chiefs and have them ready. In this case I imagine I can be
given a passage from Maskat in a man-of-war, but I should prefer the extra
ship arrangement, as it will make me more independent and I shall be able to
arrange for the more distant Chiefs to get back to their homes without diffi
culty.
Now as to the political aspect of the Durbar A public or private audience held by a high-ranking British colonial representative (e.g. Viceroy, Governor-General, or member of the British royal family). . So far as the Trucial Chiefs
are concerned, I do not think it is necessary or desirable to enter into any new
form of engagement. Our influence with these Chiefs is already predominant,
the maritime peace is ensured, intrigues with Foreign Powers provided against,
and the trade practically in our hands and, so far as I can foresee, likely to
remain so. From our point of view I think we may be fairly content with the
status guo ; whether it would be advisable looking to the future to modify
or expand this status quo is not very easy to say.
Our time-honoured policy has been as you know to maintain the maritime
peace and not to interfere in the internal quarrels of the Chiefs. As a matter
of fact, the result of our policy has been to prevent aggression by one Chief on
another. But this may not always he the case ; some of the Chiefs are grow
ing powerful and others are perhaps getting weaker and a spirit of aggression
may arise. The Chief of Debaye, for instance, might wish to try conclusions
with his neighbour at Shargah. Probably the Resident would get sufficient
warning of the likelihood of hostilities to enable him to stop the fighting,
though this would be contrary to our traditional policy. It really would not
matter very much from our point of view, so far as I can see, whether the
stronger and wiser ruler at Debaye laid his hands on Shargah or not, but of
course a period of unrest would follow and our trade interests might suffer.
It might therefore be advisable to let the Chiefs know that aggression
by one independent Chief on another independent Chief would not be viewed
w*ith approval by us. Such a warning will, I think, be quite sufficient,
and, though perhaps not immediately necessary, it might be a useful safe
guard for the future peace of the Coast. No special engagement to this
end would be required. The Viceroy at the Durbar A public or private audience held by a high-ranking British colonial representative (e.g. Viceroy, Governor-General, or member of the British royal family). might I venture to