ملف رقم ١٨٠٨ لسنة ١٩١٢ "سكة حديد بغداد. الملاحة في نهر دجلة واتفاقية لينتش مع الشركة لنقل مواد السكة الحديدية." [و‎‎٥‎٨] (٥١٤/١٢٠)

3
His Majesty’s Government in the matter of British participation in the Bagdad Bailway,
and that they will meet that sacrifice by a corresponding modification of the views set
forth in the Turkish memorandum of the 15th April.
8. His Majesty’s Government must in the first instance protest against the con-
that there is a misunderstanding with regard to the assurance given, and
repeatedly given, to Her Majesty’s Ambassador at Constantinople, to the effect that
Turkey did not entertain any intention of obtaining the supremacy over Bahrein,
Muscat, or the independent tribes on the coast of the Persian Gulf.
D. I he original despatches, duly signed and dated, in which these assurances
were reported, have been carefully preserved in the archives of the Foreign Office, and
they can readily be produced for the inspection of the Turkish Embassy.
10. His Majesty s Go\ernment maintain that prior to Midhat Pasha’s expedition
there were on the Arabian coast no symbols of Turkish authority, no 1 urkish jurisdiction
or occupation, effective or ineffective. And while they are now prepared to recognise Annex 4.
Turkish sovereignty between the southernmost limits of Koweit (as hereinafter defined)
and Ojeir, they are unable to admit that any of the arguments adduced in the Turkish
memorandum in any way invalidates the statement that south of Ojeir, in the district
of El Katif, there is no trace of 1 urkish power ever having been paramount; and they
aie fully persuaded that El Katr has never betm locally regarded as forming part of.
or indeed as being subject to the influence of, the Ottoman Empire.
f oi themselves, relying no less on the obvious facts than on the Turkish assurances
mentioned above, they have never so regarded it, and they have repeatedly informed
the Sublime Porte accordingly.
11. His Majesty’s Government can only reiterate their opinion that any lasting
settlement between the two Powers must provide for the definite renunciation by
the Ottoman Empire of the whole of the peninsula ot El Katr, including El Bidaa.
They have consistently opposed any consolidation of Turkish authority, which first
attempted to assert itself so recently as 1870, and they are bound to continue that
opposition.
12. The Turkish memorandum of the 15th April does not afford His Majesty’s
Government all the information which they consider essential to a due appreciation
of the attitude of the Turkish Government respecting Koweit. His Majesty’s
Go\ eminent are concerned to ensure the continuance of the local government of the
Sheikh of Koweit, as defined in their memorandum of the 29th July, 1911. Further,
His Majestys Government would be fully prepared to recognise Turkish suzerainty
over Koweit and indeed to recognise the Sheikh as a Turkish kaimakam, but they
attach cardinal importance to the islands of Warba and Bubiyan beinof admitted by
Turkey to be within the confines of Koweit, to the withdrawal of the Turkish military Memo-
post from Bubiyan, and to a recognition of the limits of Koweit in accordance with ^ au, * um
the indications contained in the accompanying memorandum. (Annex 4).
13. His Majesty’s Government regret that they would consider the introduction of
divided responsibility for maritime police measures altogether incompatible with the
principles and successful accomplishment of their policy in the Persian Gulf. This
policy consists in the maintenance of the maritime peace, and has been successfully
pursued, to the advantage of all concerned, for a century. To modify the svstem in
these circumstances would be alike unnecessary and unjustifiable.
14. Indeed His Majesty’s Government would go further. They consider that they
ha\e acquired by prescription not merely the right but the duty to maintain peace
in the Persian Gulf ; they have always been opposed to any proposal to trench upon
their prerogative ; and it was this attitude which led to the declaration made by the
Marquess of Lansdowne in the House of Lords on the 5th May, 1903, that “His
Majesty’s Government would regard the establishment of a naval base, or of a fortified
port, in the Persian Gulf by any other Power as a very grave menace to British interests,
and they should certainly resist it with all the means at their disposal.”
His Majesty s Government must therefore ask the Turkish Government to recognise
in the Persian Gulf the right of Great Britain—(a.) To control surveying, lighting,
buoying, and pilotage; (b.) lo police its waters; and (c.) To conduct all quarantine
arrangements.
15. In submitting these final proposals for the acceptance of the Turkish Govern
ment, His Majesty s Government are not seeking territorial aggrandisement, nor are
they embarking upon any new developments of policy. Their desire is simply to
secure the recognition and to ensure the continuance of an order of things which, in
fact, grew up under their auspices and before the appearance of Turkish authority in
the Persian Gulf, and which has been proved by experience to favour the development