خارجي ٤١/٥٠٠٠(٢) "بلاد فارس: الشؤون العامة والوضع، إلخ، بعد احتلال الحلفاء" [و‎‎١‎٩‎٢] (٤٠١/٣٨٣)

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SECRET
pit Vila
3.3620 4/* V
at* (
£*tsi)
M-.L
Frcxn Government of India^ Erxternal Affairs Dept»> to
Secretary of State for India*
Dated Simla* 15.15 hours* 50th August, 1941.
Received •13*15 hours* 30th August, 1941.
MOST IMMEDIATE*
4639 * Addressed to Secy*of State for India repeated to
Minister at Tehran Arrfbassador at Baghdad and Ambassador at Cairo
for Minister of State Cairo* Q.H.Q. India telegram NO^ISOSy/G
dated August 29th states views held by military authorities in
India in regard to terms which fi^am operational point of view
they consider should be included in any Armistice with Persia®
We suggest details (5f terms to Be offered should Bd
considered against the following Background**
(a) In negotiating with Persian Government the paramount
consideration to Be Borne in mind is necessity of maintaining a
Persian administration in Being* It would Be impossible for us
to make ourselves responsible for the administration of the
country and ineonceivaBle that we should encourage the Soviet to
do ao« For this reason we must avoid pressing Persians too hard
if we are to avoid complete disruption of the country*
(B) The entire problem must rest to great extent on the
decision made on the question whether we are to treat with and
support the Shah or to work for his elimination* Gn this point
'twK- W q have already stated our views in our telegram Ho*4623 dated
August 29th* The suggestion has neon made that if the Shah
is maintained In his authority it should Be, on the understanding,
'to Be announced publicly, that immediate extoasive reforms are
to Be undertaken. We prefer to reserve judgment on this
suggestion until we have seen Bullard’s comments*
(c) It ¥/ill presumably Be necessary to consider in
consultation with the Soviet Government the creation of "sones of
influence” Between ourselves and our Allies* Clearly such
negotiations must Be of an extremely delicate character and may
take some considerable time to conclude* The need to avoid so
far as may Be possible revival of Bitter memories of (?1907)
is obvious But problem is one which can scarcely Be evaded. We
understand that general lines advocated By our military adviser
is roughly BirjandYead Isfahan Ramadan Maragheh Razaieh But ws
cannot disguise our apprehension that there will Be utmost
difficulty in inducing the Soviet Government to agree to this
line. Since however we ape not in difefct contact with Soviet
Government we are not in a position to comment further*
(d) It is evident that Soviet Government must Be so
directe d that reactions particularly in India* U.S.A.and Turkey
f may not Be tco adverse to inevitable suggestion that we and our
Allies are engaged in dismemberment of Persia. At the same time
tee regard it as important at this stage that there should Be
wide realisation of fact that the Britjsh Empire when
challenged
RECd.POL.DEPt.
- 1 SEP *941
INDIA OFFICE