مجموعة ٦ / ٦٧ (١) "حدود جنوب شرق الجزيرة العربية وقطر". [ظ‎‎٢‎٨‎١] (٧٩٤/٥٦٧)

48
(cp. paras.
141, 148,
160.)
234. In 1855 the Wahabi Amir professed (paragraph 91), in writing to
be a Turkish dependant, and stated that he had made it clear to Mehemet AA
when the latter approached him in 1837 with a view to securing his co-operatioi^'
against the tribes of eastern Arabia, that he could do nothing without the approval
of the Sultan. In 1859 the Wahabi Amir, again m writing, referred to treaties
concluded in the past between him and the Sultan of Turkey. In 1866 the
Wahabi Amir (paragraph 92) made overtures, apparently almost simultaneously,
to Great Britain and the Turks. But the overtures of his envoy were ultimately
rejected by the Turkish Wali of Baghdad.
235 In 1871 the Turks were called in by the Amir Saud, who subsequently
became the head of the Wahabis. The negotiations between tlie Saudis and the
Turks in the 10 years which followed appear consistently to have proceeded on
the basis that the Wahabi Amirs, in return for Turkish support to enable them
to re-establish themselves in Nejd and possibly Hasa, were prepared to accept
Turkish suzerainty. In 1890 they professed their obedience to the Turkish
authorities (paragraphs 122, 124, 125). Ibn Rashid, by whom they were finally
defeated in 1888, and who, from 1876 to 1901, was the leading ruler m Central
Arabia, consistently professed allegiance to Turkey. Between 1901 and 1913,
Ibn Saud, while continually endeavouring to secure British protection and British
assistance against the Turks, on various occasions appears to have submitted to
Turkish authority (see in particular paragraphs 132, 133, 146, 147), to have
drawn allowances from them for his father or himself (paragraph 137, but see
paragraph 148), and to have settled disputes on behalf of Turkey (paragraph 146).
In May 1914, abandoning hope of active assistance of H.M. Government, he
concluded a treaty as “Wali and Commandant of Nejdwith the Wali of
Basra, “who was specially empowered by imperial iradeh,” the text of which
will be found in Appendix A, and which Is only consistent with Ibn Sand’s full
acceptance of the status of a Turkish subject and official. It may be noted, too,
that on the outbreak of the War, Ibn Saud did not repudiate allegiance to Turkey,
but gave as an excuse for his failure to lend armed assistance to the Turks that he
was engaged in hostilities with Ibn Rashid, while at the beginning of 1915 he
hinted to H.M. Government that, failing a satisfactory written understanding
with them, it would be necessary for him to make overtures to the Turks.
236. The true position is no doubt that, throughout the whole of this period,
the Wahabi Amirs, solely concerned with their own interests, were prepared to
give a formal acknowledgment of Turkish suzerainty or to pay a nominal tribute
to Turkey if by doing so they could be assured of non-interference by Turkey in
their concerns. From one standpoint it would be unreasonable therefore to attach
Undue importance to the acknowledgments of suzerainty constituted by the series
of incidents referred to above. But it is on the other hand open to H.M. Govern
ment in any dispute in which they may be concerned with Ibn Saud in which that
ruler claims that he and his ancestors have for the last century been the indepen
dent rulers of Nejd and Hasa, and that he is not the successor in title of the Turks
in those areas, should take advantage of the very frequent and consistent
reiterations of Wahabi allegiance to Turkey over almost the whole of the period.
(G) The legal position.
237. On the limited issue of the continued validity of the provisions affecting
the Blue Line and the Anglo-Turkish Conventions of 1913 (paragraph 150) and
1914 (paragraph 150 A above), the Foreign Office, at an earlier stage, expressed
the view that the Blue Line remained internationally legally binding as against
Ibn Saud. On the wider question of what precisely H.M. Government are legally
F.O. to I.O., entitled to maintain as against the King in regard to the Blue Line, they have
31.8.34. since expressed the interesting and important opinions : —
{a) That there is reason to believe that the territory immediately east of the
Blue Line, on the assumption that neither H.M. Government nor any
Arab State under their protection exercises any authority there, is at
present either res nullius or (conceivably) in parts already under the
sovereignty of Ibn Saud.
(b) That “ while we are perfectly justified to use the Blue Line and the
position of Ibn Saud as the successor of Turkey, &c., as much as we
can in negotiating with Ibn Saud in order to secure the most accept-