ملف ١٩٠٤/٢٧٦٤ الجزء ٣ "سكة حديد بغداد: مفاوضات عامة ١٩١٠-١٩١٢." [ظ‎‎١‎٠‎٤] (٥٤٤/٢١٧)

1
the two branch lines to which I had drawn his attention, and that in any case I thought
the Imperial Government had done more than sufficient to gratify Germany’s amour-
propre by withdrawing their opposition to the whole Bagdad Railway scheme.
M. Sazonow, I said, had always told me that whatever might be the interpretation given
to the term “Bagdad Railway,” Russia would continue to co-operate with us just as"’
much after as before the signature of the agreement, and I should like to know whether
his Excellency thought that it would still be possible for Russia to support us should
difficulties arise with regard to the construction of the Gulf section. M. Neratof
replied that Russia was under no obligation to facilitate the construction of the railway
and that though she could not now have recourse to methods of direct obstruction, she
could still co-operate with us in many ways and give us her indirect support. Though
his Exceilency’s language was not very clear on this point, I gather that Russia would
still be able to support any scheme which we might put forward with regard to the
construction of the Gulf section, even though it did not meet with Germanv’^
approval. J
The agreement, taken as a whole, must undoubtedly be regarded as a diplomatic
success for Germany, and a retrospect of the various phases of the negotiations which
have extended over the past nine months, does not tend to enhance the reputation of
those who have conducted them on Russia’s behalf. The initial mistake was committed
m i . onow . a } low ed himself to be entrapped, during his conversations with
M. .derlen, mto verba l assurances of which he did not at the time realise the
, ull significance.. This was due to his want of experience as a negotiator and to his
^ not weighing his words, rather than to the deliberate intention of throwing over the
1 ‘!° TTT h the ,h riple Enten - e < Tlms ’ without an y P revious consultation
flitli them he had pledged Russia to withdraw her opposition to the Bagdad Railway
scheme, and though he subsequently endeavoured to restrict this engagement to the
Romeh-Bagdad line, it was clear from the outset that Germany would hold him to the
strict letter of his bond. His disregard of the understanding on which t£ three
Governments had hitherto acted that no individual member oi the Triple Entente
was to conclude an arrangement with Germany till the other two had obtained
satisfaction for their respective claims, the vacillation and deplorable weakness which
he displayed m the discussion over the Khanikin-Tehran line, and the uneasiness
neither Ruslia V no, U Ge SSnranCeS had changed at Potsdam to the effect that
dfrecffi • * G ® rma p; w °uld join any combination that could in any way be
directed against the other, all combined to produce the impression that a serious blow
had been struck at the stability of the Triple Entente. Fortunately these fears nrovel
firm aTvoTJe ofb, ° r ’ ^ “TT * 1 ba ? k - sMi ^ M. SazTnow wa^t Crt a
tbl ^ 5^ -p f + i th mamtenance of that understanding. M. Neratof who took un
ph a 11 ieacs ^ the negotiations wlien M. Sazonow was incapacitated' by illness is
footsfeps^and tT make P f ohli ^ ed to follow ^ Sazono’w’s
tsteps and to make further graceful concessions to Germany He assures rue
nZTed w ' tTb 18 nothing kept back that does ^ot appear in the'
resueer d t i ° f the a & reement ’ beyond the verbal assurances given P by Germanv
respecting railway construction to the north of Khanikin, and that since the Germ™
entering. 11 * ^hhTtrt^
conversation with France is un rWto a a i n en S a to e d m a very delicate
while M Kiderlen mav cnuo-minl + i • ^ errQa ny as a valuable asset;
sr4=.. &£ t
what may be the outcome of tbe 6 81 - 1 ’ ’ as , l 8 . lm possible to foresee at present
no doubt well pleased to havp m l^p 18 ! rou ^ b wb ich that country is passing, she is
her a free hl^ a » —ngement under which Germany leaves
I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.