‏"ملخص الأحداث والتدابير الرئيسية التي اتخذها سمو نائب الملك اللورد كرزون من كيدليستون، نائب الملك والحاكم العام للهند في إدارة الخارجية. ‏I‏. يناير ١٨٩٩-أبريل ١٩٠٤. ‏II‏. ديسمبر ١٩٠٤-نوفمبر ١٩٠٥. المجلد IV. بلاد فارس والخليج الفارسي." [و‎‎١‎٣‎٤] (٣٨٦/٢٧٢)

just described must, lie thought, he modified because of his inability to trace
among the records in the Tehran Legation the original Persian of the Shah’s
authorisation of 1S68, a copy of which was forwarded to your predecessor with
our Secret despatch No. 56 (External) of 7th May 1903. We do not appreciate
the force of this, argument. The absence or the loss of the Persian original
cannot possibly alter the facts that the concession was granted; that it was
acted upon for 12 years ; and that incontestable traces of occupation still
survive on the spot. It appears to us, therefore, to he open to His Majesty’s
Government to adopt whichever method of procedure they may prefer.
11 . The choice may be expected in part to turn upon the present attitude
of the Persian Government and the policy that it is desired to pursue towards
them. The experience of His Excellency the Viceroy during his recent
visit to Bushire, the subsequent behaviour of the Persian Government with
regard to that incident, and the general tone of unfriendliness that has
characterised their recent communications, undoubtedly justify the adoption of a
firm attitude, and will probably not have predisposed His Majesty’s Govern
ment to any unnecessary display of courtesy. In these circumstances, it
may be thought desirable'to act upon Sir. A. Hardinge’s advice, and to restore
the telegraph station without more ado. We should be grateful for early
instructions on the subject, in order that the cable may be laid and the
necessary buildings re-erected during the present cool season. Failing the
adoption of this plan, we think that the second alternative would bo preferable
to the first, although it is to be feared, as anticipated by Sir A. Hardinge in
his letter to the Marquess of Lansdowne of 27th June 1903, that any procedure
that might open the door for discussion or protest, could not fail to be attended
by considerable delay.
12. In either case the Persian Government might be conciliated by the
proposal to carry on the telegraph wire either by land or by sea from Henjam
to Bunder Abbas. When the Viceroy was at the latter place, he was earnestly
pressed both by the local traders and also by the Salar-i-Moazzam, Governor of
the Gulf Ports, to lend his assistance to the connection of Bunder Abbas
by telegraph with the outer world ; and it is scarcely credible that the Persian
Government, unless they mean to be deliberately unpleasant, should not
welcome an extension which will be both of political and of commercial
advantage to them. Should they do so, they might opportunely be reminded
that, under the Convention of 2nd April! 868, we possess the right to continue
our land line from Jask to some point between that place and Bunder Abbas,
a phrase which might be interpreted as applicable to any spot short of Bunder
Abbas itself, such as the British Consulate at Naband, four miles on the Jask
side of the town.
13. In the event of His Majesty’s Government accepting our proposals for
the immediate re-institution of a cable station at Henjam, we trust that they
will, upon reconsideration, consent to bear at least one half of the cost of the
arrangements as requested in our Secret despatch iso. 56 (External), dated the
7th May 1903. The telegraph is asked for in the main in the interests of the
naval squadron which is maintained in the Persian Gull by His Majesty s
Government : and also on political grounds, which are divided in even propor
tions between ihe Imperial Government and the Government of India. Ihe
larger part of the expenditure on the shores of the Gull is already borne by
Indian revenues : and it does not seem fair that any fresh measures that may be
required to sustain our influence on the sea—the charge of which has hitherto
been assumed by the Home Government (with substantial contributions fiom
ourselves) should be debited exclusively to Indian funds.
11. We have now detailed at some length the proposals which we recom
mend for the protection of our paramount naval, strategical, and political
interests in the Persian Gulf. It seems to us most desirable that the oppor
tunity of acting while action is still easy, and before we can be forestalled,
should not be sacrificed : and we trust to receive early permission (in the case
of Henjam, which has already been accepted in principle, if possible by tele
graph) to proceed in the manner described.