مجموعة ٦/ ١٩ "الجزيرة العربية: (المملكة العربية السعودية) التقرير السنوي لمملكة الحجاز ونجد." [و‎‎١‎٥‎٦] (٥٤٠/٣١٢)

[10178] B 5
9
in some shape or form. As has been stated above, the Saudi delegates raised it
at the outset of the negotiations in Jedda. They reverted to it again at the end
of those negotiations, not so much with the idea of insisting that it should be
dealt with, as with the object (a) of asserting that, in their view, it was, in fact,
germane to the negotiations, and (6) of establishing the position that, if it could
not be discussed at a Saudi-Transjordan conference, it could be discussed
otherwise, i.e., with His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom. Sir
Andrew Ryan was prepared to admit this on behalf of His Majesty’s Government.
He had told Fuad Bey in a personal conversation during the conference how
useless it would be to ask His Majesty’s Government to reconsider their attitude,
but it is obvious that, by the terms of the letters attached to the Treaty of Jedda
on which the status quo rests, the Saudi Government are free to reopen the
question, whenever they think that “ favourable circumstances will permit a
final settlement.” Sir Andrew Ryan’s admission caused, however, anxiety to
Taufiq Bey Abul Huda, who feared that it might prejudice the position in the
matter of the Amir Abdullah. In deference to this scruple, Sir Andrew Ryan
fell back on the position that the matter was so far outside the scope of the
conference, that nothing at all should be postulated regarding it. There was
some talk of recording the exchange of views in an agreed minute, but, luckily,
this was lost sight of. The position therefore remains intact, but it is quite
possible that the Saudi Government may return to the charge with His Majesty’s
Government in 1934 (see paragraph 72).
Customs Relations.
36. The draft note referred to in paragraph 35 (d) of the report for 1932
remained in its pigeon-hole all the year. No dispute arose regarding trans
frontier trade, which appears to be carried on as it always has been, regardless
of controversies between Governments. The Saudi delegates pressed for a
reaffirmation of article 13 of the Hadda Agreement in the new Treaty of
Friendship. This was agreed to, subject to explicit oral statements that all that
was being done was to maintain the article with its former effects, whatever they
might be. Opportunities were taken during the first stage of the conference and
later of expressing the readiness of the Transjordan Government to define those
effects in a suitable form by an agreement as to how the principle of free transit
between Syria and Saudi Arabia should be reconciled with the legitimate rights
of the Transjordan Government, notably in regard to the control of certain classes
of trade like arms, narcotics, &c. The suggestion was also thrown out unofficially
that it might suit both parties to enter into a simple form of customs agreement.
The Saudi Government preferred that these matters should be left outside the
main treaty settlement. This was agreeable to everyone concerned. It was
thought at the same time that advantage might be taken of the presence of Fuad
Bey Hamza in Jerusalem in July to explore the issues further. In anticipation
of this possibility, His Majesty’s Minister reviewed the whole subject in a
despatch to His Majesty’s High Commissioner for Transjordan, dated the
27th June, 1933. In the event, no opportunity for dealing with the matter
presented itself during the short period of the negotiations in Jerusalem, and
the matter remained in abeyance during the remainder of the year.
(3) Yemen.
Course of Events.
37. Ibn Baud and the Imam Yahya preserved the appearance of friendship
appropriate to Arab brotherhood and their common faith throughout the revolt
in Asir during the last months of 1932. No jarring note was struck until it
became apparent about the end of January that Hasan-al-Idrisi and others had
taken refuge in the Yemen. Ibn Baud was eager to obtain their surrender and
pressed his point so strongly that the Imam apparently conceded it early in
February, on a promise by the King of pardon and good treatment for the
refugees. Weeks passed and the surrender did not take place, perhaps because
the Imam was insincere, perhaps because he could not overcome the opposition
of the Idrisi himself. At last it was announced in a Saudi communique of the
14th April that the King had not only consented to Hasan remaining in the
Yemen under the supervision of the Imam, who would guarantee his good conduct,