"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. مجلد I" [و‎‎١‎٥‎٦] (٤٥٤/٣١٦)

[|Mt | lrTr) .. , m -_------———
ATTACK ON THE SANDHILLS 287
three battalions (l/4th Hampshire, 24th and 76th Punjabis)
of his own (30th) brigade and four mountain guns being placed
at his disposal for the purpose, and the half battalion 48th
Pioneers was also to be under his orders till the line Shukhair-
Sixteen Palms had been established. Lieutenant-Colonel
Dunlop, temporarily in command of the 12th Brigade, was
instructed to be ready to attack on the left bank, when ordered,
with the two mountain guns and the 67th and 90th Punjabis.
General Gorringe retained in reserve, at his own disposal, the
half battalion West Kents, 2/7th Gurkhas, 44th Merwaras and
the sapper company. As soon as the line Shukhair-Sixteen
Palms had been established, the half battalion 48th Pioneers
was also to join this reserve.
At 12.30 a.m., on the 14th, the 76th Punjabis and the half
battalion 48th Pioneers advanced and seized the line Shukhair-
Sixteen Palms. The operation was skilfully carried out and
met with little real opposition, the British casualties being
slight.
Early on the same night, the l/4th Hampshire took over
the trenches along the Umm as Sabiyan from the 24th Punjabis,
who started with four mountain guns from the western end
of this creek at 12.45 a.m. for their enterprise against the sand
hills. This operation, which was to be carried out in heliums,
was in charge of Lieutenant-Colonel Climo of the 24th Punjabis.
Moving in single file, the heliums advanced north-westwards
along a channel clear of reeds, at a pace regulated by the
mountain gun rafts and, therefore, necessarily slow. About
3 a.m. the column was fired on by an enemy piquet and
inclined to its left to obtain the shelter of the reeds, where,
however, they found progress very slow and exhausting, as it
became necessary to man-handle the heliums for a great part
of the way. About 3.45 a.m. a heavy but inaccurate fire was
opened on the column from the north-east, but by 4.30 a.m.
a position was reached about a mile to the west of the sandhills.
Here Colonel Climo called a brief halt to ascertain his position.
About 5 a.m., when it had become sufficiently light to discern
his objective, Colonel Climo, leaving his guns with an escort
of a company, pushed on with the rest of his heliums
to within one thousand yards of the sandhills, and there
awaited the bombardment of his guns. He considered it
necessary to obtain a rapid decision before the enemy garrison
could be reinforced or the marsh Arabs could collect to attack
him. After a brief bombardment by his guns, therefore.
Colonel Climo ordered the attack to proceed.