مجموعة ٦٣/٦ "حدود جنوب شرق شبه الجزيرة العربية وقطر". [ظ‎‎٣‎٣‎٠] (٧٥٦/٦٦٧)

The Barr-al-Qarah District.
18. The importance of this district for the present purpose is first that it embraces
the coastal strip lying between the blue line and the pre-war western extremity of
Qatar, and secondly that it appears to correspond fairly closely* if not exactly, with
the triangle of land lying to the east of the blue line, which falls within the area left
to the west of the rough line indicted to Ibn Sand and Major Holmes by Sir P. Coi
in 1922 (see paragraph 6 above). Mr. Philby, with the assistance of recommendations
and guides furnished by Ibn Jiluwi, the Saudi Governor^of Hasa, travelled through
a portion of it in 1932*. The impression left by his Pmpty Quarter is that the
dominant political influence at the present day are the Saudi Government and. the
Ikhwan. Details of the Barr-al-Qarah district are given in the extract from Lorimer
reproduced as item I (v) in the Appendix to this Dote. As will be seen, Lorimer
considered that it “might perhaps be reckoned as included in the Sanjaq of Hasa 5 '—
in other words, in the pre-war Ottoman Sandjaq of Nejd. On this assumption the
boundaries of Nejd in the 1913 Convention might well have been fixed so as to
include it, with the result that the limits of Nejd would have touched the pre-war
limits of Qatar on the coastline at the head of Dohai-as-Salwa Bay, the hinterland
(actually the Jafurah Desert) being left in indeterminate ownership. For whatever
reason (and it must be assumed that substantial justification was produced to persuade
the Turks to relinquish their position in the Barr-al-Qarah) the line was in fact fixed
farther to the west. But the history of the Barr-al-Qarah, and the fact that the
1913 Convention had never been ratified, may well have been the reasons which led
Sir P. Cox in 1922 to fix the limits of Hasa at a point which included in it the
Barr-al-Qarah rather than at the blue line of the 1913 Convention.
Conclusions.
19. In the light of the examination of the position given above, and subject to the
observations of the Government of India and the Political Resident, the best course
would appear to be the following :—
(a) Boundaries of Qatar .—To agree that the boundaries of Qatar shall be accepted
as being on the north, east and west, the sea ; on the south, a line running
across the base of the Peninsula from a point not south of the latitude of the
head of Dohat-as-Salwa Bay to a point not south of the north side of the
Ivhor-al-Odeid inlet. The line indicated on the I.P.C. map would satisfy
these criteria, and if it is confirmed that it is the line at present claimed by
the Sheikh of Qatar it could be accepted. A slight modification to bring
the line some 12 miles south to the head of Dohat-as-Salwa Bay, and so to
reduce the area of sea coast in indeterminate ownership, could be considered
if necessary.
(b) The blue line of the 1913 Convention, to be maintained as against Ibn Sand,
for the reasons given in paragraph 11 above, as the eastern boundary of
Saudi Arabia.
(c) If a claim is advanced by Ibn Saud to the Barr-al-Qarah on the ground of the
line indicated by Sir Percy Cox in the Oqair conversations in 1922, referred
to in paragraph 6, that His Majesty’s Government should either—
(i) concede the claim, on the ground, if necessary, that they regarded
themselves as committed by the informal conversations of 1922, but
without prejudice to the maintenance in principle of tho blue line, and in
return for a formal recognition by Ibn Saud of the validity of this line.
The attribution to Ibn Saud of the Barr-al-Qarah area, undesirable as it
may be on other grounds, -would have the advantage of leaving no gap of
indeterminate territory bordering on the sea 1 coast, for we can without
difficulty, as suggested in (a) above, recognise the frontiers of Qatar as
beginning at Dohat-as-Salwa, i.e. at the point at which the Barr-al-Qarah
ends.
(ii) If it was thought preferable to make no concession in respect of
the blue line, then to argue that informal discussions such as those of
1922, which had never been confirmed in writing or been the subject
of formal agreement, had no binding effect, and that His Majesty’s
Government took their stand on the blue line. Play might be made with
the fact that the line drawn by Sir Percy Cox would, in fact, deprive Ibn
Saud of a substantial area lying between Djau-al-Dukhan and the western
side of the blue line.