مجموعة ٢٨ /٦٥ "بلاد فارس. العلاقات التجارية الفارسية-السوفيتية." [و‎‎١‎٩‎٩] (٤٨٢/٣٩٨)

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT
PERSIA.
CONFIDENTIAL.
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July 19, 1933.
Section 1.
[E 3917/21/34] No. 1.
Mr. Mallet to Sir John Simon.—(Received July 19.)
(No. 310.)
Sir, Gulhek, June 28, 1933.
WITH reference to Sir Reginald Hoare’s despatch No. 270 of the 3rd June
last, a conversation which I had with the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the
24th June seems worth reporting to you.
2. Feroughi was discussing possible results of the World Economic
Conference and expressing in general terms his approval of its efforts to remove
trade barriers and restrictions throughout the world, when he spontaneously
indulged in an outburst against the Soviet Government, which for a man of his
calm disposition was surprisingly violent.
3. What, he asked, could be the contribution of such a Government to the
World Economic Conference ? The whole Soviet system was the antithesis of that
freedom of trade for which the rest of the world was now apparently working.
Even if the Soviet Government were to put their signature to any form of agree
ment, how could such a document be considered anything but a scrap of paper?
The Russians were entirely faithless and false. They would pledge their word
and they would sign written agreements and then go back on them at once flagrantly
and shamelessly. Persia, continued his Highness, was in a tragic position with
such neighbours to deal with. She had been forced into the economic policy
represented by the Trade Monopoly Law in self-defence against the aggressive
tactics of Soviet commercial policy in Persia. It was true that the Trade
Monopoly Law left many things to be desired; it was cumbrous and expensive to
work and caused everybody a great deal of trouble; it could not be shown to have
improved the economic condition of the country—rather the contrary; on the other
hand, without it Persia would be now one vast dumping ground for Russian
goods, while in return the Russians would still be buying practically nothing from
Persia.
4. I gathered from this that the Persians would have been ready to
collaborate in the conference’s task of removing trade restrictions, but that they
find themselves so dependent upon their commercial relations with Russia that
they dare not relax their present regulations.
5. Feroughi then again reiterated his detestation of the Russians and all
their works. I remarked that I had seen in the newspapers that the new Soviet
Ambassador to Persia had landed at Pahlavi. Feroughi said that this was so, but
he had not heard whether M. Pastoukhoff had yet reached Tehran. I asked his
Highness what sort of reports he had received regarding the Ambassador, and he
told me that he understood that he had never held a diplomatic post abroad,
although he had worked for many years in the Eastern Department of the
Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. M. Pastoukhoff had, however, travelled in
Persia privately, for purposes of spying, no doubt, Feroughi opined. He was
reputed to have a violent manner; Ferougni did not object to this, as bad-tempered
people left him quite unmoved; what he really objected to was crookedness and
falseness, and, unfortunately, these were the qualities which could surely be
expected of any Soviet Ambassador.
6. There is a very strong feeling against the Russians everywhere here at
present. The word has, no doubt, gone forth from him who must be obeyed, and
all Government officials are consequently busy showing their anti-Soviet zeal. The
prisons, both here and in the provinces, are said to be crammed with Bolshevik
suspects. The Shah talked quite frankly with Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, who
had an audience of His Majesty recently, and bemoaned the geographical situation
of Persia, which rendered her northern and most fertile provinces peculiarly
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