مجموعة ٢٠/٥ "المسار الجوي إلى الهند - طريق الساحل العربي: التفاوض مع شيوخ الساحل المتصالح" [و‎‎١‎٥‎٣] (١٢٩٠/٣١٦)

summing xip of the piesent situation. Except in the improved relations between the
Navy and the Arab fehaikhs, there has been no material alteration hi the past
16 years. “ Europeans _ are still vigorously excluded from the coast The
prohibition has very occasionally been modified to admit of short professional visits
by American missionary doctors, but applies even to the European pearl merchant
M. Rosenthal, whose presence, last year, as a competitor to Mohamed Ali Zainal
would have been of the greatest benefit to the pearl traders of Dubai.
One of the leasons foi the ievolution m Dubai, which was attempted by the
Shaikh’s family last April, was the circulation of a story that the ruling Shaikh had
given permission to Air. Straw (representative of the Standard Oil Company) to stay
ashore for a night in Dubai while the mail ship was anchored off the coast.
We signed the Exclusive Agreements of 1892 owing to our desire to exclude the
French, and they have been useful to us. the Shaikhs welcomed the Agreements as
they accorded so well with their own inclinations; and after 1911 they have zealously
enforced the policy against ourselves.
It is our object now to modify this unwelcome development.
Although 1 do not consider it an argument for upsetting what has been done there
(see my letter to the Government of India, No. 385 S., of the 28th August 1929' :;f ), I
agree with the Senior Naval Officer that the example of Bahrain is before these
peoples’ eyes. In the future this should be a civilising force, but at present the fear of
losing their independence is a very major question and it is the greatest deterrent to
permitting Europeans the slightest footing in their land. After ali, are the Shaikhs
wrong from their point of view ? They are anxious to preserve their valued
independence and have not yet experienced the advantages of civilisation. If they
permit close contact, what will be their fate? A weak barbarian State in close
contact with a strong civilised one must sooner or later be absorbed or become a
dependency, however much the stronger may desire to avoid this course. The history
of the growth of British power in India is proof of this.
12. A British Political Agent, although our treaties of 1820 gave us the right to
appoint him, would have to be forced on the Shaikhs, and the Political Agent would
have to be protected by an armed guard, ft should be noted that our Arab Agent
maintains an armed guard at his own expense.
The, proximity of those convenient folk—the Bedouins—would always, in the
Shaikh’s mind, be a ready excuse for any “ unfortunate incident that happened to
the first Political Agent. ^ .
Owing to the maritime life of the coast towns, the Navy can deal with rectucitiauce,
and their action, possibly with the assistance of the Royal Air force, would so gieat y
exceed the hitherto mild discipline which they have occasionally administeie t lat
there would be no repetition of any unfortunate accident due to bedouins,^ w lorn
you know we cannot control ” : but this would be poor consolation for thefiist o i ica
^1 do not say that the first Political Agent would necessarily be murdered either
at once or .in the long run, but it is a possibility which must be consi eie .
I am sure that a British Political Agent would increase British influence on _
coast, and smooth all difficulties in the way of the air service. I e - e r 1 cu ies ’ °\ .
to the settled Arab policy of exclusion, are considerable. It the Arabs continue their
obstruction—and the air route is of vital importance am mils I®. ‘ \
quickly—I recommend that we force them to grant the necessai} mcr 1 _ 1 ®j ’ ‘ A,
the same time force them to accept a British Political Agent to ensure a
be no backsliding. . .. • , >v^btlmp
The amount of pressure required should not be excessive. - uin 0 tv,,/ Arabs
position of the town, the Navy could soon force any po icy ( esi _ . ^ ^ ^
might threaten to emigrate as they did alter the 1 ’ jpg Arab
trading centre such as Dubai were selected as the site foi ^ e n ,2 T 0 p 0 v ^ ers wou pi
move should not be more than a trifling annoyance. e mu v a rVrotest that they
go, but the Indian, Persian, and Bain eh trading
had been ruined, would remain and prosper. 1 b _ •» i me thod should
mustjve adopted; but I prefer that a slower and more gnidual metlroct
be tried.
but
13. The coaf
owing to
O
mst and its Shaikhs arc apparently content to
the example of Bahrain there are faint signs, of a st mm, y
P 6258/29 : European element in internal administration of Hainan